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COMMENT
The Exclusivity of the Appraisal Remedy Under the New North
Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the Standard of
Review for Cash-Out Mergers
The North Carolina General Assembly's recent substantial adoption' of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1984 ("Revised Model Act")2
greatly enhances the procedures 3 by which a shareholder may dissent from fun-
damental corporate changes.4 While liberalizing these procedures, the language
of the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act (the "new Act") simulta-
neously limits the shareholder's remedies under these circumstances to the right
of appraisal "unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent." 5 This change is a
radical departure from North Carolina's former law, which provided that a dis-
senting shareholder's right of appraisal was "[i]n addition to any other right he
1. Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-
1-01 to -17-05 (1990)).
2. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1984 was adopted by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association in the Spring of 1984. It was the first complete revision of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act since it was originally adopted in 1950. See Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, REV. MODEL BusiNEss
CORP. AcT xvii (1985).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-13.01 to -31 (1990); Minutes, North Carolina Senate Judiciary II
Committee, March 16, 1989, appendix, Summary of Major Provisions of Proposed New North Car-
olina Business Corporation Act (prepared by Russell M. Robinson, II) at 7 ("simpler and more
expeditious procedures," which are "designed to reduce delay and expense" will be available under
the new Act's appraisal remedy). For example, the new Act enhances the rights of a dissenting
shareholder by requiring the corporation to actually pay the dissenter the full fair value of the shares
plus accrued interest when the dissenter commences a judicial appraisal proceeding, thereby al-
lowing the dissenter to challenge the contested transaction with the help of these funds. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-13-30(a) (1990). In contrast, the former statute had no such "advance payment"
provision, so the actual payment to the dissenting shareholder typically occurred upon the resolution
of the judicial appraisal proceeding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1982). For a brief summary of the
new Act's right of dissent and appraisal, see Hargrove & Turlington, The Right of Dissent and
Appraisal, published by the North Carolina Bar Association Continuing Legal Education for the
November 16-17, 1989, seminar "The New North Carolina Business Corporation Act", vol. 1
(1989).
4. Regarding fundamental changes under the new Act, a shareholder may dissent and obtain
the fair value of his shares in the event of a merger, share exchange, sale or exchange of all or
substantially all assets, material amendment of the articles of incorporation, and "[a]ny corporate
action taken pursuant to a shareholder vote to the extent the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or a
resolution of the board of directors provides that voting or nonvoting shareholders are entitled to
dissent and obtain payment for their shares." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13.02(a)(1)-(5) (1990). For-
merly, North Carolina law permitted a shareholder to dissent and demand fair value for his shares
when an "amendment, charter, dissolution, merger, consolidation or sale of assets" was effected. Id.
§ 55-113(b) (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13.02(a)(l)-(5) (1990)).
5. The new Act provides that:
A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this Article may
not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement, including without limitation a
merger solely or partly in exchange for cash or other property, unless the action is unlawful
or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation.
Id. § 55-13-02(b) (1990).
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may have in law or equity .... ,"6 Whether this modification means that an
appraisal proceeding is the dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy or that he
also may make a collateral attack to enjoin or rescind fundamental corporate
transactions is "[o]ne of the most important and potentially controversial ques-
tions of state corporation law."'7
The North Carolina General Assembly adopted the "unlawful or fraudu-
lent" qualification verbatim from the Revised Model Act,8 which purposefully
left the two exceptions to the general rule of appraisal exclusivity undefined. 9
By adopting the Revised Model Act's general terms "unlawful or fraudulent,"
the North Carolina General Assembly passed the buck again, leaving these two
crucial terms open to judicial interpretation. The North Carolina courts' con-
struction and application of the "unlawful or fraudulent" qualification will de-
termine the ultimate degree of exclusivity under the new Act's appraisal remedy.
The main issue in this context is whether a breach of fiduciary duty will
constitute either unlawfulness or fraud, or both, so that a dissenting shareholder
may enjoin or rescind a fundamental corporate change or, alternatively, seek
monetary or rescissory damages for fiduciary breaches. The new Act clarifies
only that the appraisal remedy applies "without limitation" to cash-out merg-
ers.10 The North Carolina Commentary to the new Act adds that "in determin-
ing whether a merger [is] 'unlawful' or 'fraudulent,' the same standard applies,
regardless of whether the consideration received [by the minority shareholder]
was cash, other property, or shares of a surviving corporation.""1 Neither the
statute, its comments, nor prior judicial decisions in North Carolina, however,
set forth the standard for evaluating whether a cash-out merger may be enjoined.
6. Formerly, North Carolina law provided that "[i]n addition to any other right he may have
in law or equity, a shareholder giving such notice shall be entitled, if and when the amendment,
dissolution, merger, consolidation or sale of assets for shares is effected, to be paid by the corporation
the fair value of his shares .. " Id. § 55-113(b) (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b)
(1990)).
7. R. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 27.7, at 457
(1990).
8. See infra notes 44-92 and accompanying text (legislative history discussion).
9. REv. MODEL BUsINESS CORP. AcT § 13.02(b) official comment 2 (1984).
10. For a discussion of the three basic variations of cash-out mergers, see generally Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.. 1354, 1357-76 (1978) (discussing
the potential harm to minority shareholders in the two-step merger, the going private merger, and
the merger of affiliates). A cash-out merger is different from the usual merger case because the
acquiring corporation is also the controlling stockholder of the target corporation. Greene, Corpo-
rate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 489 (1976). In the cash-out
merger, the majority shareholders receive stock in the surviving corporation, continuing their equity
interest. The minority shareholders instead receive cash, eliminating their equity interest in the
corporation. Although cash-out mergers typically occur after an acquisition, they also may occur
solely for the purpose of cashing out the minority shareholder, whereby the majority shareholders of
one corporation set up a new shell corporation and vote as majority shareholders of both corpora-
tions to undergo a merger. Id. at 490. While a cash-out merger illustrates a direct elimination of
minority shareholders, other direct and indirect methods exist by which majority shareholders
"squeeze-out" or "freeze-out" minority shareholders. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.07, at 63 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS].
O'Neal compares the "direct squeeze-out" of minority shareholders via a cash-out merger to "indi-
rect" squeeze-outs via a reduction in the minority shareholder's return on his investment through
dividend reduction and/or employment termination. Id. at 64-65.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b) N.C. Commentary (1990).
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In analyzing how North Carolina courts should determine what types of
misconduct are encompassed by the terms "unlawful" and "fraudulent," the leg-
islative history of this provision in the new Act, as well as other states' interpre-
tations of the Revised Model Act's two exceptions to the general rule of
appraisal exclusivity-"unlawful or fraudulent"-are instructive. States that
have adopted the Revised Model Act's exclusivity language have given the two
exceptions of unlawfulness and fraud a wide range of treatment, from specifi-
cally deleting the two exceptions12 to retaining but explicitly defining them.13
Moreover, states that have not adopted the Revised Model Act but have ad-
dressed judicially the issue of appraisal exclusivity have followed different ap-
proaches as well.14
States that have adopted the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision and
states that have adopted a provision dealing with the exclusivity of the appraisal
remedy must define the limitations of their statutory language. Typically these
statutes contain the "unlawful" or "fraudulent" terms found in the Revised
Model Act or some qualifying variant. 15 Other states, which have no provision
in their corporation statutes governing this issue, particularly Delaware, have
12. See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 104-90, 220-30 and accompanying texts.
15. Thirty-three states expressly provide that the appraisal remedy is the exclusive remedy in
some circumstances. Of these, twenty-two jurisdictions have provisions comparable to § 13.02(b) of
the Revised Model Act's language providing the appraisal remedy is exclusive except where the
corporation action is "unlawful [or illegal] or fraudulent." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-1302(B) (Supp.
1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-4-123(4) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1302(5) (West Supp. 1990);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-80(d) (1988); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-80(d) (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE
§ 490.1302(2) (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.13-020(2) (Michie 1989); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 156B, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762(3) (West 1990); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 794-13.02(b) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-810-(4) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2079(4) (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:81(IV) (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-15-
3(D) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.554(2) (Supp.
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-6-23.3 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102(b)
(1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(B) (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-1302(b) (1989); Act of
July 13, 1990, § 351.875(2), 1990 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1310, 1336 (Vernon); Act of April 23, 1990, No.
303, § 180.1302(d)(5), 1990 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1855, 1925 (West).
Some exclusivity provisions provide that the appraisal remedy is exclusive except in the absence
of "fraud" or where the corporate action is "fraudulent" only. MnIN. STAT. § 302A.471(subd. 4)
(1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-87(4) (1985).
Washington provides that the appraisal remedy is exclusive unless non-compliance with proce-
dural requirements or fraud occurs. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.12(G) (Vernon 1990) and
WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.13.020(2) (1990) (recently adopted substantial parts of the Revised Model
Act which became effective July 1, 1990).
A splash of variety is illustrated by California, Georgia, Illinois, and New Jersey. California
provides that a shareholder entitled to dissent has no right to attack the validity of the merger except
in an action to test the sufficiency of the vote authorizing the action; California has other exceptions
as well. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312 (West Supp. 1990). Georgia recently adopted the Revised Model
Act's exclusivity provision limiting the "unlawful" language to procedural non-compliance and
within the year amended it to qualify the "fraudulent" language to deceptive behavior in connection
with the approval vote required for the corporate action. GA. CODE ANN. § 1,1-2-1302(b) (1989); see
infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. Illinois provides that a shareholder entitled to dissent
may not challenge the corporate action "unless the action is fraudulent ... or constitutes a breach of
a fiduciary duty." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 11.65(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). New Jersey
provides that a dissenting shareholder shall not be excluded from filing suit on the ground that the
corporate action is "ultra vires, unlawful or fraudulent." NJ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-5(2)
(West 1989). Pennsylvania, in its recent revision of its corporate code, provided that "absent fraud
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
relied on state court decisions to define the limitations of the appraisal remedy.
In this manner, certain judicial tests have evolved for determining whether equi-
table relief is appropriate despite the availability of the appraisal remedy. The
two major tests-the "entire fairness" 16 and the "business purpose" 17 tests-
are creatures of case law, originating in the Delaware courts and frequently fol-
lowed by several other state courts.
Given that the new Act adopts the Revised Model Act's terms "unlawful or
fraudulent," North Carolina courts now must decide what, if any, are the limits
of these broad statutory terms. In particular, North Carolina courts must deter-
mine how these terms bear upon two issues: first, whether a breach of fiduciary
duty occurs when the majority shareholders freeze out the minority sharehold-
ers; and second, whether this fiduciary breach constitutes illegal or fraudulent
action within the meaning of the appraisal provision. Further, North Carolina
courts now must decide to what extent the new North Carolina appraisal exclu-
sivity provision should include either or both of these judicially created tests
developed in other jurisdictions.
This Comment addresses the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy from the
perspective of a minority shareholder eliminated in a cash-out merger and places
special emphasis on the vulnerability of the close-corporation shareholder in
such a merger. After exploring the history of cash-out mergers, this Comment
looks briefly at the former law in North Carolina under which the appraisal
remedy was non-exclusive. The Comment then examines the current law in
North Carolina, and its legislative history and official comments, which make
the appraisal remedy expressly exclusive absent "unlawful or fraudulent" mis-
conduct. The Comment next explores the appraisal exclusivity language under
the Revised Model Act and considers different approaches taken by various
states recently in adopting the Revised Model Act's appraisal exclusivity provi-
sion. With this background, the Comment next considers the possible ap-
proaches and authority available to North Carolina for interpreting a cash-out
or fundamental unfairness," dissenters' rights and remedies at law were exclusive. 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1105 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
Two states have an exclusive appraisal remedy. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373(f) (West
1987) (providing expressly that the remedy is "exclusive"); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-44-8(c) (Bums
1989) (recently adopting the Revised Model Act language providing that a "shareholder... may not
challenge the corporate action creating ... the shareholder's entitlement" but omitting the "unless
the corporate action is unlawful or fraudulent" clause).
Finally, Maine has a non-exclusive appraisal remedy. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 909(13) (1981) ("No action by a shareholder in the right ofthe corporation shall abate or be barred
by the fact that the shareholder has filed a demand for payment of the fair value of his shares ....").
South Carolina adopted the Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 13.02(a), providing particu-
lar corporate actions entitle a shareholder to the appraisal remedy, but South Carolina omits the
exclusivity provision contained in the Revised Model Act at § 13.02(b). S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-
102 (Law. Co-op. 1990). The South Carolina reporters' comments explain this omission as follows:
Subsection (b) of the 1984 Model Act section contains a provision attempting to limit
judicial scrutiny of corporate actions that give rise to dissenters' rights. There was nothing
similar in prior South Carolina law, and it is not included in the new provision because it
would probably be largely ineffective and is undesirable.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102 reporters' comments 2 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
16. See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 105-50 and accompanying text.
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merger as a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the controlling shareholders to
the minority, and whether it is "unlawful" or "fraudulent" misconduct or both.
In addition, the Comment considers the two judicial tests frequently applied in
jurisdictions that have statutory language similar to that of North Carolina.
Given that the business purpose test is the more controversial of the two tests,
this Comment notes the influence that the business purpose test may have on the
ultimate interpretation of the exclusivity provision in North Carolina.
This Comment suggests that the North Carolina courts should interpret the
general statutory terms of "unlawful" and "fraudulent" misconduct to include a
breach of fiduciary duty when a controlling shareholder eliminates a minority
shareholder through a cash-out merger without a business purpose, where fair
procedures and full disclosure have not occurred, and where a fair price is not
paid. This Comment concludes that all shareholders, both controlling and mi-
nority, would benefit from North Carolina's adoption of a standard of review for
cash-out mergers that includes both the entire fairness and business purpose
tests. Given the special plight of close corporation minority shareholders, whose
investment expectations may be dramatically different from those of public in-
vestors, 18 this Comment further concludes that the dual tests operating together
create a standard that is particularly appropriate in the close corporation con-
text where investors are especially vulnerable to fiduciary abuses by controlling
shareholders.
I. HIsTORicAL PERSPECTIVE
4. Common-Law Treatment of Minority Shareholders
Early common law required unanimous shareholder consent to effect a fun-
damental corporate change, such as a merger or sale of all or substantially all
corporate assets. 19 Thus, one shareholder could block all other shareholders
from making any economically desirable fundamental change and consequently
impede the economic progress of the corporation.20 The basis of the one-share-
holder veto developed under the vested rights doctrine.2 1 Courts viewed the
corporate charter as a contract, both among the corporation's shareholders and
between the corporation and the state, under which every shareholder had
vested rights.22 The shareholder's vested rights included the right to maintain
his equity interest in a corporation.23
As commerce exploded with the industrial revolution, the common-law re-
18. See infra notes 231-59 and accompanying text.
19. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. Rnv.
233, 236-37 (1931); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL
L.Q. 420, 420-22 (1930); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergerm A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.
L. R v. 624, 627 (1981); Note, Valuation of Dissenrers'Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1453, 1453-54 (1966).
20. Weiss, supra note 19, at 627.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wright v. Orville Gold Silver & Copper Mining Co., 40 Cal. 20 (1870); Beloff v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
1991]
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quirement of unanimity proved to be a formidable barrier to American
corporate growth.24 A minority shareholder who exercised his single vote un-
scrupulously could enjoy a tyrannical hold on a corporation. 25 Legislatures re-
sponded by enacting statutes liberalizing the unanimous vote requirement for
fundamental corporate changes.26 These laws enabled corporations to consum-
mate fundamental changes with either a majority or supermajority shareholder
vote.27 Although this liberalization of corporate law foreclosed the minority
shareholder's tyrannical leverage, it opened the door to his possible
victimization. 28
B. Cash Merger Statutes: Enactment and Application
Early merger statutes contemplated that once a majority or supermajority
shareholder vote approved a merger, shareholders of merged corporations would
receive shares in the surviving corporation so that their equity interest would
continue.29 Because no state legislature had granted a corporation or its major-
ity shareholders the express power to force the minority shareholder to relin-
quish his continued equity interest,30 courts, at least through the late 1920s,
were sympathetic to complaining minority shareholders who resisted such merg-
ers.31 Liberalization of merger statutes to allow cash as permissible merger con-
sideration3 2 weakened the minority shareholders' capacity to withstand mergers,
24. Schinner, Dissenting Shareholders'Statutory Right to Fair Cash Value: Armstrong v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 22 AKRON L. REv. 261, 265 (1989).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 265 n.30; Weiss, supra note 19, at 629.
28. Schinner, supra note 24, at 265.
29. Weiss, supra note 19, at 629-30.
30. Id. at 629.
31. Id. at 631.
32. The Florida legislature enacted the first cash merger statute in 1925, which provided for
"distribution of cash, notes, or bonds." Act of June 1, 1925, ch. 10096, § 36, 1925 Fla. Laws 134(current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1102 (West Supp. 1990)). By 1931, lawmakers in Arkan-
sas, California, and Ohio also had enacted cash merger statutes. See Act of April 1, 1931, Act 255,
ch. 1, § 61, 1931 Ark. Acts 860 (current version at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-26-1001 (1987)); General
Corp. Law, ch. 862, § 361, 1931 Cal. Stat. 1809 (current version at CAL. CoRn. CODE § 1101(d)(West 1977)); General Corp. Act § 8623-67, 1927 Ohio Laws 35 (current version at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (Anderson 1978)). In 1936, the New York legislature was the first state
legislature to adopt a short-form merger statute that permitted the use of cash. Act of May 28, 1936,
ch. 778, § 1(1), 1936 N.Y. Laws 1658 (current version at N.Y. Bus. CoRn. LAW § 905(a)(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1986)). A short-form merger statute typically allows a company that holds 90-95% of the
stock of another company to merge the two corporations after only an approval vote by the acquir-
ing company's board of directors, wherein cash may be designated as the sole consideration paid by
the parent under the merger plan. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1464 (5th ed. 1980). Long-form merger statutes typically have no threshold stock
ownership requirement but require that the directors and shareholders of both corporations vote on
the transaction. Id. at 1462. As originally enacted, New York's short-form merger statute applied
only to certain limited types of corporations such as gas or electric companies but was extended in
1949 to apply to all corporations. Act of April 22, 1949, ch. 762, § 1(1), 1949 N.Y. Laws 1707
(current version at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a)(3) (McKinney 1986)). In 1957, Delaware
adopted a short-form merger statute that permitted cash as merger consideration, modelled after the
New York law. Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121, § 253(a), 51 Del. Laws 188 (1957) (current version at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Cum. Supp. 1988)). While legislatures authorized cash as merger
consideration for short-form mergers from the 1930s into the 1950s, widespread adoption of cash as
[VCol. 69
APPRAISAL REMEDY
however, because the courts accepted these statutes as implicit authorization of
cash-out mergers. 33
With the passage of merger statutes that allowed cash as permissible merger
consideration, the concept of the "cash-out merger" was born. Frequently em-
ployed as a method of eliminating the minority shareholder, the cash-out merger
derived its name from the distribution of cash to shareholders of an acquired
corporation in exchange for their stock. As a result, the minority shareholders
who received cash were forced out, while the majority shareholder continued his
equity interest in the surviving corporation.
Commentators offer evidence that, in enacting the first cash merger stat-
utes, legislatures did not intend either explicitly or implicitly to authorize the use
of the cash-out jnerger to eliminate minority shareholders.3 4 Courts, however,
interpreted the cash merger statutes to permit this result. The earliest 3s case
reaching this conclusion was Beloffv. Consolidated Edison Co.,36 decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1949. This case transformed the shareholder's
vested rights in a corporation. No longer did a shareholder have a vested, con-
stitutional right to continue his shareholder status. Rather, according to the
court in Beloff, "the merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right; to
have the value of his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his
permissible consideration in long-form mergers did not occur until the 1960s. In 1961, the New
York legislature permitted the use of "cash and other consideration" in long-form mergers. See Act
of April 24, 1961, ch. 855, § 902(a)(3), 1961 N.Y. Laws 1629 (current version at N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1986)). The "and" was changed to "or" in 1962. Act of April 24,
1962, ch. 834, § 61, 1962 N.Y. Laws 2947. In 1967, Delaware amended its long-form merger statute
to include cash. General Corp. Law, ch. 50, § 251(b)(4), 56 Del. Laws 206 (1967) (current version at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2510b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1988)). North Carolina, which allowed short-form
and long-form mergers initially in 1955, amended its procedure in 1969 to permit cash as considera-
tion. Act of June 11, 1969, ch. 751, § 37, 1969 N.C. Sess. Law 780 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-106(b)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1 1-01(b)(3) (1990)). The
long-form merger provision under the original Model Business Corporation Act was amended in
1969 to allow cash as well. Robinson, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C.L. REv. 515,
517 n.7 (1983). For an excellent in-depth review of the history of cash-out mergers, see Weiss, supra
note 19, at 626-657; see also Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the "New" Appraisal Remedy, 62
WASH. U.L.Q. 415, 416-18 (1984); Note, Corporation Law-Weinberger v. UOP, Inc- Delaware
Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers, 62 N.C.L. REv. 812, 812 n.3 (1984) (sum-
marizing the three types of cash-out mergers and giving a brief synopsis of the development of these
transactions).
33. Weiss, supra note 19, at 633. Professor Weiss notes that some commentators have argued
that lawmakers enacted the first cash merger statutes to implicitly authorize and facilitate cash-out
mergers. Id.; see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 987,
1026-27 (1974) (such statutes reflected a preference for flexibility and corporate democracy over
vested shareholder rights). Weiss argues that a "better explanation for the enactment of cash merger
statutes is that they were designed to provide corporate managers with additional flexibility in struc-
turing clearly permissible transactions" such as the sale of assets. Weiss, supra note 19, at 637.
34. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 632-41.
35. Robinson, supra note 32, at 517; Weiss, supra note 19, at 643.
36. 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); see also Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch.
7, 11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962) (court observed that the real purpose of the sholt-form merger statute
was giving the parent corporation an easy means of eliminating minority shareholders), overruled by
Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. 1978), overruled, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983); David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del Ch.
1971) (approving long-form cash-out merger in Delaware); Wilcox v. Stem, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 202, 219
N.E.2d 401,404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 44 (1966) (approving long-form cash-out merger in New York).
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
right to an appraisal."'3 7
Indeed, courts have viewed appraisal rights as the quid pro quo for the
dissenting shareholder's loss of his common-law veto right over fundamental
corporate transactions.3 8 A critical issue is whether this remedy of requesting
judicial review of the price offered to the dissenting shareholders is the share-
holder's exclusive remedy or whether equitable actions such as seeking an in-
junction against or rescission from consummation of the merger are available as
well.3 9 Because current statutes4° permit mergers where stock is exchanged
solely for cash, the majority shareholders and corporation should have broad
powers to achieve this end. However, this power is juxtaposed against the com-
mon-law fiduciary duty owed by a controlling shareholder to a minority share-
holder to treat him fairly.4 1 The tension between the majority shareholder's
power and his fiduciary duty,4 2 pervasive in the historical development of cash-
out mergers, is equally prominent today. Indeed, the continuing goal of permis-
sive merger statutes is to achieve a proper balance between the rights and inter-
ests of majority shareholders and the rights and interests of the minority
shareholders.4 3
37. Beloff, 300 N.Y. at 19, 87 N.E.2d at 564 (citation omitted). The court continued:
He has no right to stay in the picture, to go along into the merger, or to share in its future
benefits. He has no constitutional right to deliberate, consult -or vote on the merger, to
have prior notice thereof or prior opportunity to object thereto .... In none of this do we
see any deprivation of due process, or of contract rights.
Id.
38. Note, Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J. 258, 266-67.
39. This issue did not come to the forefront of state corporation law until 1952 with the deci-
sion in Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952). The "Delaware cases have
provided the lead" in this area starting with Stauffer, through the Singer trilogy and the later Wein-
berger progeny. Robinson, supra note 32, at 518.
40. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Cum. Supp. 1988), (short-from merger) and § 251(b), (c)
(Cum. Supp. 1988) (long-form merger); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney 1986) (short-form
merger) and § 903 (McKinney 1986) (long-form merger); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04(b)(2) (1990)
(short-form merger) and § 55-11-03 (1990) (long-form merger). But see Alpert v. 28 Williams St.
Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568, 473 N.E.2d 19, 25,483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 673 (1984) (stating that "technical
compliance with the Business Corporation Law's requirements alone will not necessarily exempt a
merger from further judicial review" prior to discussing fiduciary duty vested in directors and major-
ity shareholders).
41. See 41pert, 63 N.Y.2d at 568-73, 473 N.E.2d at 25-28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 673-77 (discussing
the fiduciary duty of the corporation and majority shareholders in the face of a "freeze-out merger").
42. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text. Initially, state courts ignored enforcing
majority shareholders' fiduciary duties, forcing minority shareholders to seek injunctive relief under
claims of securities fraud for breach of fiduciary duty in federal courts. See Note, Suits for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty under Rule lob-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874,
1876-77 (1978). Although the United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), held that breach of fiduciary duty was by itself not fraudulent under the full disclo-
sure purpose and "deceptive or manipulative" language of rule lOb-5, the Court articulated the
"need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers." Id. at 480. The Delaware court
was quick to respond to the United States Supreme Court's inherent criticism of the states' lack of
governance in this area by strengthening the standards of review pertaining to fiduciary breaches
arising in the cash-out merger. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) overruled by
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers:
The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 27 (1983).
43. See Weiss, supra note 42, at 1-2.
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II. NORTH CAROLINA RiEVISION
A. Adopting the Revised Model Act's Appraisal Exclusivity Provision44
In its former dissenters' rights statute, North Carolina provided that the
appraisal remedy was non-exclusive.45 Upon recent revision of the corporate
code, however, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted virtually verba-
tim the language of the Revised Model Act, making the appraisal remedy ex-
pressly exclusive absent "unlawful or fraudulent" conduct. The only significant
modification to the Revised Model Act language is that the new North Carolina
Act applies the provision explicitly to cash-out mergers4 whereas the Revised
Model Act makes no such clear indication.47
Although the final provision adopted by the North Carolina General As-
sembly closely resembles the Revised Model Act's appraisal exclusivity provi-
sion, the section as initially introduced" underwent significant statutory surgery
in the legislative process, practically all of which was eventually disregarded in
the final passage of the bill. The appraisal exclusivity provision was "hotly de-
bated" 49 over the several months that the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act Drafting Committee ("Drafting Committee"), 50 appointed by the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission ("Statutes Commission") 51 to assist in
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b) (1990) (as adopted and modified from the REv. MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 13.02(b) (1984)).
45. See supra note 6.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b) (1990) ("including without limitation a merger solely or
partly in exchange for cash or other property").
47. See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (1984) (contains no such express lan-
guage) and § 13.02 official comment 2 (1984) (refers generally to "corporate change").
48. S. 280, 139th N.C. Gen. Assembly (1989).
49. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 7 (February 2, 1988) (reporting on the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee's activity on the provision).
50. The North Carolina Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee [hereinafter Drafting
Committee] was composed of Chairman Russell M. Robinson, II, of the Charlotte firm of Robinson,
Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.; Professor Thomas L. Hazen of the University of North Carolina School
of Law; Doris R. Bray and Michael R. Abel of the Greensboro firm of Schell Bray Aycock Abel &
Livingston; Professor James D. Cox of the Duke University School of Law; and Clarence W. Walker
of the Charlotte firm of Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman. (William L. Bondurant of the
Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation was appointed but later resigned).
51. In 1945, the North Carolina General Assembly established the General Statutes Commis-
sion [hereinafter Statutes Commission]. Act of February 16, 1945, ch. 157, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws
167 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 164-12 (1987)). One of its primary purposes is "[teo recommend
to the General Assembly the enactment of such substantive changes in the law as the Commission
may deem advisable." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 164-13(a)(4) (1987). In 1985, the Statutes Commission
undertook to revise the corporate code and appointed the Drafting Committee to assist in this task.
Telephone conversation with Bly Hall, Assistant Revisor of Statutes, Statutes Commission (May 23,
1990) [hereinafter Conversation with Hall]; Robinson, Report to Corporate Counsel Committee of
North Carolina Bar Association at I (March 18, 1988). As the Drafting Committee completed its
work on each article, it reported its proposal and underlying supportive theories to the Statutes
Commission. Typically the two bodies would debate back and forth about the proposed provisions
to reach mutually satisfactory language. The Statutes Commission, established by the Legislature,
however, had the final power to overrule the Drafting Committee's choice of language, but seldom
exercised this power. Conversation with Hall, sUpra. The Drafting Committee first met on Decem-
ber 20, 1985, to discuss an overview of the needed changes and "decided not to change the basic
philosophy of Chapter 55 [the North Carolina Business Corporation Act] which is pro shareholder."
Business Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes at 4 (December 29, 1985). The Drafting Com-
mittee intended to revise the current statute by adopting only desirable new provisions from the
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studying and updating the former North Carolina corporate code, considered it.
In the initial step, the Drafting Committee extensively discussed
the meaning, application, and policy considerations of this statutory
provision, especially in connection with closely held corporations. The
[Drafting] Committee attempted in several ways to clarify further the
provision's liberalizing purpose and correlative liberalizing of "fair
value" as the minority shareholders' normally exclusive protection.
Finally, the [Drafting] Committee agreed that the most important
point to establish is that in most cases the majority shareholders
should be allowed to cash out the minority shareholders.5 2
Over the months, the Drafting Committee had several discussions about the
meaning of "unlawful" and "fraudulent." Early in its discussions, the Drafting
Committee limited "unlawful" to include only procedural violations.5 3 The
Committee also extensively debated the more difficult matters of whether the
term "fraudulent" 5 4 should include action that was "inequitable," "unconscion-
able, .... breach of fiduciary duty" or some variation thereon5 5 and whether the
business purpose test5 6 should be a factor.57
In its initial discussions, the Drafting Committee believed that Delaware's
Revised Model Act. Robinson, Report to Corporate Counsel Committee of North Carolina Bar
Association at 1 (March 18, 1988). Six months into the process, however, the Drafting Committee
decided to overhaul the corporate code by substantially adopting the Revised Model Act. Id.; see
also Business Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes at 5 (July 21, 1986) (all relevant portions of
the official comments to the Revised Model Act to be included as annotations to the new Act). The
Drafting Committee and the Statutes Commission originally had hoped to introduce the proposed
legislation in the 1987 session of the General Assembly, but the process was delayed. Faced with the
urgency in the General Assembly to finish the 1988 short session relatively early, the Drafting Com-
mittee recommended and the Statutes Commission agreed to ask the General Assembly to form the
Corporate Law Study Commission to help them introduce the bill in 1988. Conversation with Hall,
supra. However, members of the General Assembly felt that the 1988 session would be too short to
fully consider such major legislation, forcing its sponsor to withdraw the bill. Finally, during the
1989 session on February 27, 1989, the bill was introduced again and ultimately ratified into law on
June 8, 1989. Thus, over a three and one-half year period, the Statutes Commission, the Drafting
Committee, and the Corporate Law Study Commission diligently worked to revise the new Act.
Throughout this three-year process, "[i]ts provisions [were] discussed, probably cussed-massaged,
modified, meditated and mediated by dedicated and brilliant North Carolina legal minds." State-
ment of Robert L. Strickland, Chairman, Lowe's Companies, Inc., before the North Carolina Senate
Judiciary II Committee (March 30, 1989) (advocating passage of the bill).
52. R. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 27.7, at 457-58 n.5 (quoting Business Corporation Act
Drafting Committee Minutes at 8 (September 21, 1987) and at 14 (October 28, 1987)).
53. The Drafting Committee clarified the broad term "unlawful" by limiting "unlawful" corpo-
rate actions to violations of "this Chapter, the articles of incorporation or a shareholders' agreement
valid under section 55-7-31." Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 14 (Octo-
ber 28, 1987) and at 9-10 (December 21, 1987). By this express language, the Drafting Committee
arguably foreclosed the argument that by cashing out the minority shareholder, the majority share-
holder breached his fiduciary duty so as to have committed an "unlawful" corporate action. By
limiting the term "unlawful" to merely procedural compliance with statutory merger requirements,
the Drafting Committee narrowed "unlawful" to exclude underlying substantive issues of fairness
and fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholder otherwise contained in the term. See infra
notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
54. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 12 (October 28, 1987) (concerns
over "unlawful or fraudulent" language expressed).
55. Id at 9-10 (December 21, 1987).
56. See infra notes 105-50 and accompanying text.
57. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 8-9 (December 21, 1987).
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"entire fairness" test set forth in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.58 should apply to
closely held corporations. 59 According to the minutes, the Drafting Committee
thought that under the "entire fairness" doctrine, "the minority shareholders are
dealt with openly and fairly in that the majority shareholders are conscientiously
trying to pay the minority shareholders a fair price for their shares and there is
no oppression, injustice, trickery, monkey business, or other unusual
circumstances." 60
Later, the Drafting Committee considered the Weinberger court's rejection
of the business purpose requirement. 6 1 The Drafting Committee agreed that it
did not want to introduce the business purpose test into the Revised Model Act
language, noting that some jurisdictions have been so expansive in their interpre-
tation of the requirement that it has become "virtually meaningless."' 62 How-
ever, upon further discussion, Drafting Committee members noted that
Weinberger's rejection of the business purpose test is probably the minority
viewpoint and that even Delaware courts are retreating from the Weinberger
rule.63 Ultimately, after months of debate, the Drafting Committee chose to
exclude the business purpose test by express language in the new provision, seek-
ing to focus instead upon "fairness to the shareholders, not the presence or ab-
sence of a business purpose." 64 Thus, the Drafting Committee Clearly intended
that Weinberger's "entire fairness" test be a part of the review standard but
chose expressly to exclude, as did the Weinberger court, the business purpose
test from the standard.
One month prior to the resolution of the business purpose test issue and the
Drafting Committee's adoption of its final version of the exclusivity provision, 65
concern arose among Drafting Committee members that North Carolina's pro-
vision as then drafted 66 would be even more restrictive than Delaware's judicial
58. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
59. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 8 (September 21, 1987).
60. Id. at 8-9.
61. See infra text accompanying note 150.
62. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 8-9 (December 21, 1987); see
General Statutes Commission Minutes at 7 (February 5, 1988).
63. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 8-9 (December 21, 1987); see
infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
64. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 7 (January 18, 1988) (draft of
the exclusivity provision appearing in the January 18, 1988 minutes was the version ultimately intro-
duced in the Senate on February 27, 1989 with only minor modifications); General Statutes Commis-
sion Minutes at 7-8 (February 5, 1988) (explaining the Committee's decision to eliminate the
business purpose test from the proposed statute as a basis for attacking a merger: first, judicial
interpretations of the rule have left the term with little real meaning, so that it affords little protec-
tion to minority shareholders, and second, the proper focus is the fairness to the shareholders, not
the presence or absence of a business purpose).
65. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 7 (January 18, 1988).
66. North Carolina General Statutes section 55-13-02(b), as proposed by the Drafting Commit-
tee and appearing in the Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes on December 21,
1987, read:
(b) A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this
Chapter may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement, including without
limitation a merger solely or partly in exchange for cash or other property, unless the
action violates this Chapter, the articles of incorporation or a shareholders' agreement
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interpretation of the exclusivity of appraisal rights. 67 Therefore, the Drafting
Committee outlined five possible alternatives to address the problem. First, the
Drafting Committee could adopt the Revised Model Act language unchanged.
Although this alternative "appeared to afford a dissenter access to a judicial
forum, [t]he primary difficulty [with this choice] lay in the interpretation of 'un-
lawful.' "68 The Drafting Committee was aware that under the Revised Model
Act, the term could be interpreted broadly to include acts such as self-dealing or
could be restricted to actions that were "merely procedurally irregular," such as
improper voting.69 The Drafting Committee noted that adopting the Revised
Model Act's exclusivity provision without modification left the interpretation to
the courts. 70 The Drafting Committee felt comfortable with its clarification of
"unlawful" as encompassing action that "violates this Chapter, the articles of
incorporation or a shareholders' agreement valid under section 55-7-31,71 and
opted to retain this language.72
The other four alternatives discussed by the Drafting Committee focused on
broadening the language surrounding the "fraudulent" exception. One proposed
alternative was to broaden the term "fraudulent" to read: "is fraudulent or in-
equitable by reason of special circumstances with respect to such shareholder or
the corporation."'73 Drafting Committee members criticized this language as
too vague and uncertain. 74 Another alternative was to broaden the term "fraud-
ulent" by adding the language: "is fraudulent or constitutes a breach of fiduci-
ary duty."17 5 While the Drafting Committee noted that the advantage of this
language was the large body of law defining a fiduciary breach, it nonetheless
believed that its inclusion would be "undesirably inconsistent," given the Re-
vised Model Act's lack of reference to "fiduciary duty" in section 8.30, which
sets out standards for director conduct.7 6 The Drafting Committee also consid-
ered including the term "unconscionable" as an additional exception but felt
"unconscionable" was not defined sufficiently. 77
Finally, the Drafting Committee adopted a fifth alternative that amended
the provision by adding the words "or is established by clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence to be... grossly inequitable with respect to such shareholder"
valid under section 55-7-31, or is fraudulent with respect to such shareholder or the
corporation.
Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 9 (December 21, 1987).
67. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 9 (December 21, 1987).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The final adoption and enactment of the law by the Legislature adopted the Revised Model
Act language, almost verbatim, leaving the ultimate interpretation of the provision to the courts.
71. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
72. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 9 (December 21, 1987) (this
language appeared in the provision as introduced to the Senate in S. 280, 139th N.C. Gen. Assembly
(1989)); see infra notes 82 and 88.
73. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 10 (December 21, 1987) and at
12-13 (October 28, 1987).
74. Id. at 10 (December 21, 1987).
75. Id.; see id. at 10-14 (October 28, 1987).
76. Id. at 10 (December 21, 1987).
77. Id.
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to the end of the subsection applying to "fraudulent." 7 8 In doing so, the Draft-
ing Committee analogized a shareholder challenge of a completed corporate
transaction under the equitable relief exception to an action to reform an instru-
ment because of fraud. The Drafting Committee reasoned that "the same reluc-
tance to disturb settled transactions in the latter case, in which the burden of
proof is the equitable standard of 'clear, cogent and convincing' evidence, should
also carry over to the former so that the same standard of proof would apply to
both."' 79 The Drafting Committee especially believed the higher proof standard
should apply to the "grossly inequitable" language because the term was "elastic
and there [was] no body of case law interpreting it, as there [was] for fraud."' 80
As such, the adoption of the fifth alternative represented a "hard-won compro-
mise" among Drafting Committee members because several members had fa-
vored limiting relief under this subsection to cases of "outright fraud only."81
Thus, in its final form the Committee's version modified the Revised Model Act
by: 1) explicitly rejecting the business purpose test; 2) defining "unlawful" to
include essentially procedural violations of the new Act, charter or shareholder
agreements; 3) including "grossly inequitable" as an extension of fraud; and 4)
raising the proof level for fraud and "grossly inequitable."'82
This final draft passed to the Statutes Commission, which made one major
modification to the exclusivity provision by deleting the higher "clear, cogent,
and convincing" standard of proof to be applied to fraud and tile "grossly ineq-
uitable" language.83 The Drafting Committee requested that the Statutes Com-
mission reconsider its deletion.84 The Statutes Commission eventually
acquiesced s and agreed to all the language recommended by the Drafting Com-
78. Id.; id. at 7 (January 18, 1988); id. at 14 (February 24, 1988).
79. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 15 (March 4, 1988). The General Statutes Com-
mission later deleted, then reinstated the specific phrase "by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence"
after discussion of the Drafting Committee's reasoning in originally adopting this language. See
infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
80. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 15 (March 4, 1988).
81. Id.
82. The Drafting Committee's final draft of the exclusivity provision, which eventually was
introduced to the Senate, stated:
A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this Chapter
may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement, including without limita-
tion a merger solely or partly in exchange for cash or other property, even if undertaken
without a business purpose, unless the action (i) violates this Chapter, the articles of incor-
poration or a shareholders' agreement valid under section 55-7-31, or (ii) is proven by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence to be either fraudulent with respect to such share-
holder or the corporation or is grossly inequitable to such shareholder.
Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 7 (January 18, 1988); see also S. 280,
139th N.C. Gen. Assembly (1989) (identical substantive language with only grammatical changes).
83. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 8 (February 5 1988) (The Statutes Commission,
"[a]fter some discussion, and due largely to the extreme difficulty in proving fraud in this State,"
voted to delete the phrase "by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.").
84. Business Drafting Committee Minutes at 14 (February 24, 1988); General Statutes Com-
mission Minutes at 12-13 (March 4, 1988); Corporate Law Study Commission Minutes at 8-9
(March 17, 1988) (noting the disagreement and ongoing negotiations between the Drafting Commit-
tee and the Statutes Commission over this issue).
85. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 16 (May 13, 1988). Eight months later, lobbyists
asked that the "grossly inequitable to such shareholder" language be deleted, expressing concern
that the phrase could be used by minority shareholders of a public corporation to impede a corporate
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mittee,8 6 which was ultimately adopted by the Corporation Law Study Commis-
sion8 7 and introduced in the Senate.
The bill, originally introduced into the Senate on February 27, 1989, paral-
leled and clarified the Revised Model Act's rule of exclusivity absent "unlawful
or fraudulent" conduct.8 8 The bill passed the Senate without revision.8 9 The
House, however, eliminated the modifications. Faced with a strong minority
shareholder lobby which proposed that the appraisal remedy be nonexclusive for
non-public corporations, 90 the Legislature struck a compromise. As proposed
by the House Judiciary Committee,9 1 the entire General Assembly deleted the
transaction. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 9 (January 24, 1989). The
Drafting Committee decided not to recommend any changes to the provision, explaining that § 55-
13-02(b) represented a "hard-fought compromise" among Drafting Committee members and had
been "thoroughly debated by the [General Statutes] Commission." Id. at 9-10. The Committee
explained its position:
The phrase "grossly inequitable to such shareholder" does not address shareholders in
general but is intended to address the situation where for some reason a single shareholder
is impacted differently from the remaining shareholders. The phrase represents a small
safety valve where, for example, a shareholder, who invests patent rights in a corporation
with the firm understanding and expectation of benefiting from the success of the corpora-
tion, becomes a minority shareholder and is cashed out by the majority shareholders on the
verge of the corporation's realization of the patent's economic value. Under these circum-
stances, the minority shareholder might be able to prove that the corporate transaction is
grossly inequitable.
Id.
Thus, the "grossly inequitable" language apparently was intended as an aid for minority share-
holders in a close corporation setting.
86. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
87. CORPORATE LAW STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1988 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 7-8 (1989). The General Assembly established the Corporate Law Study Com-
mission [hereinafter Study Commission] by House Bill 1409 and Senate Bill 950, enacted as Part
XIIIA of Chapter 873 of the 1989 Session laws. Id. at 1. The Study Commission consisted of eight
members: three members of the House, three members of the Senate, and two public members. Id.
The Study Commission, using the previous groundwork and expertise of the General Statutes Com-
mission and Business Drafting Committee, focused on the substantive changes and policy decisions
as set forth in the revision of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act. Id. at 2. After meeting
to review Article 13 on dissenters' rights on March 17, 1988, the Study Commission on May 25,
1988, voted to recommend the enactment of the Revised Model Act as amended by the Study Com-
mission. Id. at 7-8. The Study Commission adopted North Carolina General Statutes § 55-13-02(b)
as drafted and recommended by the Drafting Committee and the Statutes Commission.
88. As introduced, North Carolina General Statutes § 55-13-02(b) read as follows:
A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this Article may
not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement, including without limitation a
merger solely or partly in exchange for cash or other property, even if undertaken without
a business purpose, unless the action (i) violates this act, the articles of incorporation or a
shareholders' agreement valid under G.S. 55-7-31, or (ii) is proven by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence to be either fraudulent with respect to such shareholder or the corpo-
ration or grossly inequitable to such shareholder.
S. 280, 139th N.C. Gen. Assembly (1989).
89. S. 280, Senate Judiciary II Committee Substitute, adopted May 3, 1989, 139th N. C. Gen.
Assembly (1989).
90. Once the bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Hear-
ings, its members proposed: (1) to amend subsection (b) to apply to "shareholder(s] of any public
corporation" and (2) to add a new subsection (c) after subsection (b) to read in pertinent part: "A
shareholder of a corporation, that is not a public corporation.., shall in addition to the right to
dissent, have all other rights arising in law or equity." North Carolina House Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Hearings Minutes (May 24, 1989).
91. S. 280, House Committee Substitute, reported favorable, June 1, 1989, 139th N. C. Gen.
Assembly (1989). The House Judiciary Committee, sensing the whole bill would fail given the tug-
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explicit rejection of the business purpose test, the procedural compliance limita-
tion upon "unlawful," the extension of fraud to gross inequity, and the higher
"clear, cogent and convincing" standard of proof for fraud and gross inequity,
reinstating the Revised Model Act's "unlawful or fraudulent" language. 92 Only
the application of the exclusivity provision to cash-out mergers survived the leg-
islative knife. As a product of this significant compromise, the final enacted
version of the statute saddled the North Carolina courts with the task of deter-
mining the extent of the exclusivity by construing and applying the statute's
terms "unlawful" and "fraudulent."
B. Interpreting the Appraisal Exclusivity Provision under the New Act
Interpretation of the appraisal exclusivity provision will require the courts
to answer several controversial questions. Should "unlawful" include a breach
of fiduciary duty or should it be limited to only procedural matters such as viola-
tions of the new Act or corporate charter? Should "fraudulent" include only
actual deception or should the term also encompass constructive fraud from
breach of fiduciary duty? How much protection do minority shareholders in
North Carolina expect or deserve? The Revised Model Act's language, com-
ments, and history, the treatment of the issue by leading states such as Delaware
and New York, and approaches taken by other states that have adopted the
Revised Model Act or dealt with the issue judicially may provide some guidance
to the courts as they seek to resolve these questions.
1. Appraisal Exclusivity under the Revised Model Act
The Revised Model Act, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1984,
grants a shareholder facing an impending merger a right of dissent and ap-
praisal.93 The Revised Model Act explicitly provides that a dissenting share-
holder "may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement [to
dissent] unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent."' 94 Under the Revised
Model Act, the appraisal remedy is the dissenting shareholder's exclusive rem-
edy unless one of the two exceptions is triggered by some type of misconduct.95
of-war on this issue, reinstated the Revised Model Act's wording: "unless the action is unlawful or
fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation." North Carolina House Judiciary
Committee Minutes at 1 (May 31, 1989).
92. S. 280, House Committee Substitute, reported favorable, June 1, 1989, 139th N. C. Gen.
Assembly (1989). This final version was passed by the full House on June 5, 1989, concurred in by
the Senate on June 7, 1989, and ratified on June 8, 1989, nearly three and one-half years after work
on the new Act had begun. Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 648 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b) (1990)).
Notably, after the bill was introduced into the Senate, "in response to even stronger concern
expressed by practicing lawyers, and upon further reflection," the Drafting Committee recom-
mended (1) deleting the "unlawful" qualification, the extension of fraud to gross inequity as well as
the higher "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" requirement, and (2) retaining both the explicit
reference to the cash-out merger and the explicit rejection of the businesss purpose test. Business
Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 3-4 (April 8, 1989).
93. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(1) (1984).
94. Id. § 13.02(b).
95. Id. § 13.02(b) official comment 2.
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In retaining this language, the drafters of the Revised Model Act followed the
language as originally set forth in New York Business Corporation Law Section
623(k) for making appraisal the dissenters' sole remedy absent fraud or
unlawfulness. 9 6
The Revised Model Act purposefully left the terms "unlawful" and "fraud-
ulent" undefined. The official comments to the Revised Model Act state that
"[b]ecause of the variety of situations in which unlawfulness and fraud may ap-
pear, this section makes no attempt to specify particular illustrations." 97 The
official comments instead offer some examples of shareholder or corporation
misconduct that might come within the exceptions such as voting irregularities,
shareholder deception and "violation of... fiduciary duty." 98
The official comments further state that, rather than specifying what types
of action constitute illegality or fraud, section 13.02(b) "is designed to recognize
and preserve the principles that have developed in the case law of Delaware,
New York and other states with regard to the effect of dissenters' rights on other
remedies of dissident shareholders." 99 The official comments then cite Wein-
berger100 for the proposition that the "appraisal remedy may not be adequate
'where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate as-
sets, or gross or palpable overreaching are involved.' "101 Significantly, the Re-
vised Model Act is silent on the issue of the business purpose test,10 2 a test
96. Id.; see Act of April 24, 1961, ch. 855, § 623(k), N.Y. Laws 1597 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1986)). In the early sixties, most state statutes and the
Model Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act") were silent on the issue of appraisal exclusivity.
Vornberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholders' Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189,
1207 (1964). Although the Model Act followed state law developments concerning the exclusivity
issue in its annotations, it did not adopt an appraisal exclusivity provision until 1978. Committee on
Corporate Laws, Amendments on Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sec-
tions 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587, 2591 (1978); see MODEL BUSiNEss CORP. ACr § 80(d)
(1979) (appraisal exclusivity provision originally adopted in 1978 included the "unlawful or fraudu-
lent" exception to exclusivity); see also Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation ActAffecting Dissenters'Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977) (the proposed language
in 1977 was "illegal or fraudulent" based on the Massachusetts statute; other states' provisions were
discussed in the comments to section 80(d), including states which listed "charter conflicts" and
improper shareholder voting as exceptions to exclusivity); infra note 173 and accompanying text.
97. REv. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr § 13.02(b) official comment 2.
98. Id The official comments to the Revised Model Act state:
If the corporation attempts an action in violation of the corporation law on voting, in
violation of clauses in articles of incorporation prohibiting it, by deception of shareholders,
or in violation of a fiduciary duty-to take some examples-the court's freedom to inter-
vene should be unaffected by the presence or absence of dissenters' right under this chapter.
IdL
99. Id.
100. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see infra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
101. 457 A.2d at 714 (citation omitted).
102. See infra notes 105-150 and accompanying text.
The New York Court of Appeals follows the business purpose test. Alpert v. 28 Williams St.
Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 573, 473 N.E.2d 19, 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677 (1984). Delaware, however,
rejects it. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. Yet the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision is
designed to incorporate the principles of both these states' decisions. By (1) following the language
of the New York appraisal exclusivity provision, which later was held in Alpert to incorporate the
business purpose test, and (2) referencing specifically to Delaware's Weinberger decision, which ex-
pressly rejects the business purpose test, the Revised Model Act, apparently inadvertently, sets up
this dichotomy.
[Vol. 69
APPRAISAL REMEDY
which has been employed by many jurisdictions to evaluate the validity of cash-
out mergers. 103
2. States Cited by the Revised Model Act: Delaware and New York
Delaware
Delaware General Corporation Law does not have a provision mandating
the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy.1 4 The Delaware Supreme Court, how-
ever, has addressed the issue, registering a dramatic reversal of its holdings twice
in a six-year period.
In 1977 the decision in Singer v. Magnavox Company'0 5 gave birth to the
business purpose rule and also perpetuated the "entire fairness" test first enunci-
ated in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation. 106 Decided on the heels of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,10 7
the Singer case attempted to strengthen the standards of review for mergers
under Delaware law in light of the United States Supreme Court's implicit criti-
cism of Delaware's corporate law in Santa Fe.'0 8
In Singer, the minority shareholder sued for nullification of a proposed
merger and for compensatory damages. Although the merger satisfied the long-
form statutory procedural requirements, 109 the plaintiffs argued that the merger
nevertheless was "fraudulent because it did not serve any business purpose other
than the forced removal of the minority shareholders" and that the majority
breached its fiduciary duty to the minority by approving the merger at a price
that was grossly inadequate.' 10 The lower court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that appraisal was the exclusive remedy." 1 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, stating that a long-form merger, "made for the sole purpose of
103. See infra notes 177-90 and 222-30 and accompanying texts.
104. The New York corporation statute, unlike the Delaware corporate code, contains an exclu-
sivity provision, which was the exact "formula" followed by the Revised Model Act. REV. MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 13.02(b) official comment 2 (1984).
105. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
106. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952) (controlling shareholder, standing on both sides of the
merger, was held to have the burden of proving the merger's entire fairness, which he met when the
court reasoned that liquidation value was not the determinative factor of price in a merger, such that
minority shareholder was not entitled to the higher liquidation value of the assets upon consumma-
tion of the merger).
107. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (minority shareholder sued to set aside a short-form cash-out merger,
alleging the parent majority shareholder had paid a wholly inadequate price so as to breach its
fiduciary duty, which constituted securities fraud). The Santa Fe Court limited the application of
rule lOb-5 by requiring that liability under the rule be based on deception and not on breach of
fiduciary duty alone. See infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
108. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80 ("There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary
standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint."); see Weiss, supra note 42, at
27 n.173; see also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 10, at 1354 n.2 (suggesting Singer was the
Delaware court's response to Cary's article, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), which advocated comprehensive federal fiduciary standards and
which was cited by the United State Supreme Court in Santa Fe).
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974).
110. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 972, (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
I11. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), modifed, 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977).
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freezing out minority shareholders, is an abuse of corporate process; and...
[supports] a cause of action for violation of a fiduciary duty."'1 12 After Singer a
long-form merger accomplished without a valid business purpose11 3 constituted
a breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law and could be enjoined.1 14
Three months after the Singer decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
broadened the scope of what could constitute a valid business purpose. In
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,115 the court clarified whose
business interest must be served and how compelling that interest must be to
satisfy the business purpose test. In Tanzer the controlling shareholder wished
to effect a merger to obtain long-term financing. 1 6 The court limited its review
of the controlling shareholder's purpose to its fiduciary duty as a shareholder,
ignoring its fiduciary duty as a director. 117 As a shareholder, the controlling
parent had the fundamental right to vote its shares in its own interest.1 18 The
court found the controlling shareholder's self-interested motive of facilitating its
own debt financing to be a legitimate business purpose. Citing Singer and Ster-
ling, however, the court remanded the case for the parent corporation as con-
trolling shareholder to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction. 119 The
Singer and Tanzer decisions 120 made it clear that, although minority sharehold-
112. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
113. Moreover, the court emphasized that the majority shareholder could not discharge its fidu-
ciary duty merely by establishing a valid business purpose. In addition, the controlling shareholder
must meet its burden of proof under the "entire fairness" test first enunciated in Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). This test refers to the court's scrutiny
of the fairness of the transaction as a whole; it was later refined in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), to include two aspects: "fair dealing" and "fair price." See infra notes 134-54
and accompanying text.
114. The court in Singer explained Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78
(1962), overruled, Roland Int'l Corp. v. NaJiJar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1978), overruled by Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281
A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. Stauffer and Schenley, among other cases, "de-
veloped a body of law that permitted [both short- and long-form] cash out mergers, without any
limitations expressed, as a valued minority elimination device." Robinson, supra note 32, at 518.
Notably, the court in Singer did not find it necessary to distinguish the facts of Stauffer and Schenley
from Singer, since neither case "involved a merger in which the minority was totally expelled via a
straight 'cash-for-stock' conversion in which the only purpose of the merger was ... to eliminate the
minority." Singer, 380 A.2d at 978. The court pointed out that in Stauffer, the issue solely involved
"a difference of opinion as to [the] value of the converted shares," for which the appraisal remedy
was available. Id. Moreover, the Singer court noted that the Schenley case did not involve a cash
merger "the sole purpose of which was to eliminate minority stockholders." Id. at 979 (emphasis in
original).
115. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (for the purpose of facilitating long-term financing, the parent
corporation effected a reverse triangular long-form cash-out merger of an 81%-owned subsidiary
into a new shell subsidiary corporation formed by the parent corporation), overruled by Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
116. Id. at 1124.
117. Id. at 1123. See also Weiss, supra note 42, at 31-32 (suggesting that under Delaware law a
majority shareholder who takes action as a shareholder need not take into account other sharehold-
ers, but when a majority shareholder exercises power through the directors of a controlled corpora-
tion, he must then protect or advance the interests of all shareholders).
118. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123.
119. Id. at 1124.
120. Weiss, supra note 19, at 666-67 n.275. Singer and Tanzer were under consideration for an
"extended and substantially overlapping" time period, were decided three months apart by the same
three-judge panel, and involved related issues. Id. Weiss suggests that the two "cases should be
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ers were no longer limited to the appraisal remedy, they could be eliminated in a
transaction, the only purpose of which was to further the interest of the control-
ling shareholder.1 2 1 By allowing such selfish action, the court in effect eviscer-
ated the business purpose test.1 22
The Delaware Supreme Court soon extended application of the business
purpose test to short-form mergers in Roland International Corporation v. Naj-
jar. 123 In Najiar the court stated that, while the purpose of the short-form
merger statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating
the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise, the merger must have a
valid business purpose as required by Singer.1 24 The court declared that the
fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholder is an overriding obligation owed
equally to any minority shareholder, no matter how large or small. 125 The stat-
ute permits the elimination of the minority shareholder only as an incidental
cost of a merger conducted for a business purpose other than elimination of the
minority shareholders. 126
Although the controlling shareholder's fiduciary obligation could not be
avoided by technical compliance with merger statutes, the parties could agree
contractually to eliminate any common-law fiduciary duty. In Coleman v.
Taub,127 the Third Circuit imposed neither the business purpose nor fairness
requirements when a minority shareholder contracted away his right to remain a
shareholder. In Coleman the minority shareholder of a close corporation had
agreed earlier to a buy-back provision in his employment contract, which stated
that upon termination of his employment "for any reason whatsoever," the cor-
poration had the right to repurchase his shares at an agreed-upon price or at a
price determined by three impartial appraisers. 128 The court held the Singer!
Tanzer/Najjar reasoning did not apply because the contract altered the fiduciary
duty; a freeze-out under these circumstances was not a breach of that duty.
1 29
analyzed as parts of a whole, rather than as sequential statements dealing with different fact pat-
terns." Id.
121. Cf Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112
(1986) (controlling shareholder's attempt to restructure the company through a merger so that cor-
porate income could repay the personal debt he incurred to buy the company held to be an invalid
corporate purpose). See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
122. Weiss, supra note 19, at 664, 667, 671 n.300; see Robinson, supa note 32, at 520-21; Stein-
berg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 359 n.37 (1984); see
also Weiss, supra note 42, at 34 (suggesting that the Tanzer court's analysis was "inconsistent with
traditional fiduciary doctrine" and "threatened to strip all content from the [business] purpose
test").
123. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
124. Id. at 1036.
125. Id. (short-form merger statute "may not be used to short-circuit the law of fiduciary duty").
126. Comment, Shareholders' Rights in Short-Form Mergers The New Delaware Formula, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 687, 709 (1981).
127. 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (the 99% controlling shareholder set up a shell corporation,
wholly owned by him and created solely as a merger vehicle to cash-out the 1% minority
shareholder).
128. Id. at 636-37.
129. Id. at 636. The court stated:
[A] minority shareholder may bargain away the 'additional interest' in corporate participa-
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After announcing the business purpose test in Singer in 1977, just six years
later the Delaware Supreme Court summarily overruled the Singer trilogy "as a
departure from prior case law."'130 The landmark case of Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. 131 reinstated the "well established principles... mandating a stockholder's
recourse to the basic [appraisal] remedy,"' 132 but excepting from this rule cases
in which "fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate
assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved."' 133 In addition to over-
ruling the business purpose test, Weinberger provided guidance for the applica-
tion of the entire fairness test by further delineating its two prongs of fair dealing
and fair price. 134
In Weinberger, Signal Companies, Inc., sought to invest its cash surplus.
The company acquired fifty and one-half percent of the outstanding shares of
UOP, Inc. in 1975 through a friendly tender offer for twenty-one dollars a share,
with the stock trading just under fourteen dollars a share. 135 Signal controlled
UOP's thirteen-member board by appointing seven of its members, including
four members who were also top ranking officers of Signal and who served on
Signal's board. 136 In 1978, still with surplus cash and having found no other
tion which might otherwise be the basis for a fiduciary duty on the part of the majority.
Once such bargaining away is established, Delaware law has nothing to tell us regarding
the need for a valid business purpose in order to justify a merger for it is only the 'addi-
tional interest' that calls for an inquiry into business purpose .... Thus, if such an inquiry
is inappropriate because the minority's additional interest has been bargained away, the
merger cannot, in itself, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Id.
130. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983); Note, Weinberger to Rabkin:
Fine Tuning the Doctrine of Corporate Mergers, I1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 839, 840-841 (1986); see also
Note, supra note 32, at 824-25 (stating that "this flip-flopping in the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion is troublesome").
131. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
132. Id. at 715 (citations omitted); see also Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 122, at 365 (explain-
ing the liberalized Weinberger appraisal remedy).
133. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (citing Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56,
156 A. 183, 187 (1931), as a basis for the five exceptions created by the Weinberger court in which
minority shareholders are not limited to the appraisal remedy); see also Steinberg & Lindahl, supra
note 122, at 365 n.75.
In Cole, the [court] discussed the concepts of actual and constructive fraud in the context
of an injunction against a merger. To prove constructive fraud in the alleged undervalua-
tion of shares, the dissenting shareholder must show that the valuation constitutes a con-
scious abuse of discretion, breach of trust, or mal-administration manifestly causing injury
to the dissenting shareholder. Mere inadequacy of price does not equal fraud unless the
undervaluation suggests bad faith or reckless indifference to the rights of the minority
shareholder.
Id.
134. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. Fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction
was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the ap-
provals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained." Id. Fair price "relates to the eco-
nomic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets,
market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company's stock." Id. Finally, Weinberger discarded the outmoded "Delaware block"
method as the exclusive valuation method and broadened the court's review to include "all relevant
factors" as determined by "generally accepted techniques used in the financial community" and used
by other courts. Id. at 712-13.
135. Id. at 704.
136. Id. at 704-05.
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suitable acquisitions, Signal decided to acquire UOP's remaining shares. It of-
fered the same twenty-one dollars a share, representing a substantial premium
over the market price at that time.
Two of Signal's officers who also sat on UOP's board conducted an internal
feasibility study-for use only by Signal--of the possible acquisition. 137 This
study, based on information acquired from UOP, concluded that acquisition of
UOP's remaining stock at a price up to twenty-four dollars per share would
return fifteen and one-half percent to Signal, which was a good investment.138
Signal then negotiated the price with UOP's outside directors, but did not dis-
close the results of this study-its maximum price of twenty-four dollars-to
them. 139 The parties submitted the merger to the shareholders, still without
disclosing Signal's maximum price, whereby the twenty-one dollars price per
share was approved.140 The plaintiff, a minority shareholder of UOP, attacked
the merger, initially claiming it lacked a proper business purpose under Singer
and, unaware of the nondisclosures, that the price was unfair. The chancery
court dismissed the suit.14 1 Given that Signal, owning only fifty and one-half
percent of the outstanding shares, had conditioned the merger upon a vote of
two-thirds of all outstanding UOP shares, the court found no self-dealing be-
cause the majority had not used its controlling position to force approval of the
merger.142
Having discovered the nondisclosures, plaintiffs amended their complaint
to add that Signal had violated its fiduciary duty by distributing misleading
proxy information that failed to disclose material facts about how the merger
price was established, resulting in a tainted shareholder vote. 143 The chancery
court, after evaluating the alleged misrepresentations to UOP's shareholders, the
137. Id. at 705.
138. Id. at 705, 709.
139. Id. at 709.
140. Id. at 708-09. Certain precautions were taken by UOP's board to insure that the merger
transaction was fair. UOP first retained an investment banker who hurriedly concluded the transac-
tion was fair. Id. at 706. With the fairness opinion in hand, the outside directors then approved the
merger proposal. Id. at 707. Signal also conditioned the merger upon the approval of a majority of
the minority shares actually voting on the issue and upon the condition that the minority shares
actually voting, when coupled with Signal's 50.5% interest, would comprise at least two-thirds of all
UOP's shares. Id. at 707. Given the holding of the case, Weinberger provides a "road map for the
majority to avoid any serious challenge to the legality of a freeze-out" when they comply with cer-
tain special precautions involved in fair dealing and fair price. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out
Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REv. 517, 522, 542 (1984); see also Payson & Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc:
Its Practical Significance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. I CoRP. L. 83,
86-91 (1983) (discussing independent negotiation committees as a cure for the conflict of interest and
nondisclosure problems cited in Weinberger and the special merger approval vote by a majority of
the minority shares as a device to shift the burden of proving unfairness to the minority sharehold-
ers, suggesting the "easiest merger agreement to defend" will contain both). But see Weiss, supra
note 42, at 49-53 (questioning the effectiveness of "independent" negotiating committees and fairness
opinions in light of "the opportunities for formal compliance with, and substantive evasion of, judi-
cially-mandated procedures"). In Weinberger, Signal's attempted special precautions of fairness
were thwarted by its failure to fully disclose the maximum price it had derived with information
obtained through interlocking directors. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
141. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1268 (Del. Ch. 1979).
142. Id. at 1264-66.
143. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1341 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
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alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the interlocking directors, and the alleged
inadequate price, concluded the merger was legally fair. 44 Regarding the spe-
cial structure of the merger vote, 145 the chancery court held that such vote did
not establish automatically that Signal had discharged its fiduciary duty, but the
court did consider the special structure as another factor in evaluating entire
fairness. 146 Concerning the business purpose, the court found that Signal had
shown a legitimate business purpose, namely that "Signal itself was an invest-
ment company" and that UOP was the "best possible placement" of its surplus
cash.1 47
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, 148 holding that the ma-
jority must prove the approval vote is a fair, fully informed vote while the mi-
nority must prove unfairness resulting from the majority's specific acts of fraud
or misrepresentation. 149 In its opinion, the court abolished Singer's business
purpose test, stating that this test gave no "additional meaningful protection" to
minority shareholders. 150 The court announced that the appropriate fiduciary
standard is solely the entire fairness test enunciated in Sterling, redefining the
test as having two aspects: fair dealing and fair price.151
Noting that fair dealing embraces the timing, initiation, structure, disclo-
sure and means of obtaining director and stockholder approval of the merger,
the court found that the majority failed to disclose fully material information,
thereby breaching its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. 152 Moreover,
the parent's non-disclosure and the cursory preparation of its fairness opinion
tainted the vote so that the transaction failed the "fair dealing" aspect of the
entire fairness test.153 Thus, through the fair dealing aspect of the entire fairness
test, the court evaluated and enforced the majority shareholder's fiduciary obli-
gation to the minority shareholder.15 4
After Weinberger, Delaware operated under the rule that, absent fraud,
misrepresentation, and other limited circumstances, a minority shareholder's ex-
144. Id. at 1362-63.
145. For the merger to be approved, two things were required. First, a majority of the UOP
minority shareholders actually voting on the transaction had to approve. Second, at least two-thirds
of all outstanding shares had to approve. Signal owned only 50.5% of the outstanding shares. Id. at
1361.
146. Id. at 1362.
147. Id. at 1350. Commentators noted the decision "rendered the business purpose test utterly
meaningless." See, eg., Booth, supra note 140, at 521.
148. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
149. Id. at 703.
150. Id. at 715.
151. Id.; see also supra note 134. See generally Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 122, at 366-89
(discussing fair dealing and fair price).
152. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
153. Id. at 711-12. Concerning fair price, the court abolished the rigid "Delaware block"
method as out-dated, extending fair price considerations to include all relevant factors-assets, mar-
ket value, earnings future prospects, dividends--evaluated under any generally accepted financial
technique. Id. at 711-13. The court remanded the case to allow the lower court to apply the new
liberalized valuation standard. Id. at 715.
154. Weiss, supra note 42, at 49; see Coleman, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Freeze-Outs:
Questions of Valuation and Exclusivity, 38 Sw. LJ. 775, 790 (1984).
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clusive remedy was the right to demand a liberalized appraisal proceeding
where both fair dealing and a fair price were mandated.155 This result stemmed
from the court's conviction that the overriding concern of minority shareholders
is to be paid a fair price for their stock. 156 Weinberger left unanswered the ques-
tion of what circumstances would render the liberalized appraisal proceeding
"inadequate" so as to allow the minority shareholder "any form of equitable and
monetary relief."15 7
In Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corporation,158 the Delaware
Supreme Court addressed this question. For the first time since Weinberger, the
court focused upon the exclusivity issue, holding that the plaintiffs' specific alle-
gations-that defendants breached their fiduciary duty by deliberately manipu-
lating the timing of the merger-stated a claim for equitable relief, despite the
absence of claims of nondisclosure or misrepresentation.15 9 In Rabkin the mi-
nority shareholder challenged a cash-out merger on the grounds that the price
offered was grossly inadequate because the acquiring corporation unfairly and
purposefully manipulated the timing' 60 of the merger to avoid a one-year com-
mitment to the minority at a higher price per share.161 The plaintiffs claimed
that the entire fairness test entitled them to relief broader than an appraisal. 162
155. See supra note 134.
156. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
157. Id. at 714. Another issue left unanswered by Weinberger but analyzed extensively by legal
commentators was the question of how a minority shareholder procedurally should pursue equitable
relief: in a separate action or within the appraisal proceeding itself. Eg., Weiss, The Law of Take
Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 245, 256-60
(1983); Payson & Inskip, supra note 140, at 95; Note, supra note 130, at 8,47-49. The Delaware
Supreme Court in 1988 handed down Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988),
which gave some guidance on this issue. In Cede & Co., the court held that a minority shareholder
who had begun an appraisal proceeding after dissenting from a cash-out merger could still bring an
action for fraud discovered after the appraisal proceeding had begun. Id. at 1189. Plaintiffs may file
a separate action alleging fraud, fiduciary breach or other misconduct and then consolidate the two
actions in one proceeding, instead of amending the complaint to enlarge the appraisal action to
include the fraud or fiduciary breach allegations. Id. at 1189-90. During the consolidated proceed-
ing, if the plaintiff proves misconduct by the defendant such as fraud or a fiduciary breach, then the
appraisal action would be rendered moot. Id. at 1191. However, if fraud is not proven, then the
plaintiff is entitled to collect the fair value of its shares pursuant to the statutory appraisal provision.
Id.
158. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
159. Id. at 1104-05.
160. The Weinberger court suggested that the timing of the transaction was a critical factor in
procedural fairness. 457 A.2d at 711.
161. 498 A.2d at 1101, 1103. On March 1, 1983, defendant purchased 63.4% of Hunt's out-
standing common stock at $25 per share pursuant to a stock purchase agreement that also required
defendant to pay $25 per share if it acquired the remaining Hunt stock within one year thereafter.
Id. at 1101. While the defendant circulated interoffice memoranda disclosing its intentions to even-
tually acquire the minority interest, the defendant's board of directors waited to approve the transac-
tion until one week before the one-year commitment period expired, so that the merger was
consummated on July 5, 1984, after the prescribed period ended. Id. at 1102.
162. Id. at 1103. Specifically, the minority argued that an appraisal would be inadequate
because:
(1) the alleged wrongdoers are not parties to an appraisal proceeding, and thus are not
personally accountable for their actions; (2) if such misconduct is proven, then the corpora-
tion should not have to bear the financial burden which only falls upon it in an appraisal
award; and (3) overreaching and unfair dealing are not addressed by an appraisal.
Id. at 1104.
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The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that absent decep-
tion, Weinberger mandated appraisal as the only remedy available to the minor-
ity. 163 The Delaware Supreme Court viewed the holding in Weinberger as
"broader than the scope accorded it by the trial court."16' 1 By requiring "decep-
tion," the lower court limited the Weinberger exclusivity exceptions to actual
fraud. 16 5 The Delaware Supreme Court read these Weinberger exceptions to the
exclusivity rule more broadly to include certain types of fiduciary breaches, and
arguably constructive fraud, stating in short, "fair dealing does not turn solely
on issues of deception."166 The court found that the plaintiff had alleged facts
sufficient to support a claim that the parent corporation, 167 as controlling share-
holder, had breached its duty of fair dealing.168
The Rabkin court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that defendants un-
fairly manipulated the timing of the merger to purposefully avoid a bargain due
the plaintiffs. The court found this to be "bad faith go[ing] beyond issues of
'mere inadequacy of price.' ",169 The Delaware Supreme Court stressed that the
lower courts must take care to distinguish true fiduciary breach cases that de-
mand equitable relief from cases involving merely price inadequacy where only
an appraisal is appropriate. 170
In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court in Rabkin refined Weinbergers ap-
praisal exclusivity rule 171 to include certain types of fiduciary breaches, arguably
constituting constructive fraud, in addition to actual fraud.172 The entire fair-
163. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("Where...
there are no allegations of non-disclosures or misrepresentations, Weinberger mandates that plain-
tiffs' entire fairness claims be determined in an appraisal proceeding."), rev'd, 498 A.2d 1099 (Del.
1985).
164. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1100.
165. Rabkin, 480 A.2d at 660; see Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1100, 1103; Note, supra note 130, at 857.
166. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1104-05 (emphasis added). Referring to the unfair timing of the cash-
out merger, the court stated that "inequitable conduct will not be protected merely because it is
legal." Id. at 1107.
167. Id. at 1106 (discussing that there is no "safe harbor" for interlocking directors who are
charged with the duty of good faith and fairness to both corporations).
168. Id. at 1105-08.
169. Id. at 1107 (quoting Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 156 A. 183,
188 (1931)). Cole evaluated constructive fraud as requiring an injunction when a breach of trust,
maladministration or conscious abuse of discretion is proven. Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n,
18 Del Ch. 45, 57, 156 A. 183, 187 (1931).
170. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107-1108.
Necessarily, this will require the [lower courts] to closely focus upon Weinberger's mandate
of entire fairness based on a careful analysis of both the fair price and fair dealing aspects of
a transaction .... Moreover, our courts are not without a degree of sophistication in such
matters. A balance'must be struck between sustaining complaints averring faithless acts,
which taken as true would constitute breaches offiduciary duties that are reasonably re-
lated to and have a substantial impact upon the price offered, and properly dismissing those
allegations questioning judgmental factors of valuation. Otherwise, we face the anomalous
result that stockholders who are eliminated without appraisal rights can bring class ac-
tions, while in other cases a squeezed-out minority is limited to an appraisal, provided
there was no deception, regardless of the degree of procedural unfairness employed to take
their shares. Without that balance, Weinbergers concern for entire fairness loses all force.
Id. (citations omitted).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
172. See Note, supra note 130, at 858-59.
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ness test continues to be the current standard of review in Delaware, under
which only fair price and fair dealing are primary factors. Although Weinberger
discarded the Singer trilogy's business purpose test, the Delaware Supreme
Court retreated from this position under Rabkin, allowing breach of fiduciary
duty considerations to come into play under the "fair dealing" aspect of the
"entire fairness" test in Rabkin. Thus, under the current state of corporate law
in Delaware, the courts exercise a broader scope of review under the "entire
fairness" test after Rabkin refocused Weinberger's appraisal exclusivity rule.
New York
The Revised Model Act perpetuated the exclusivity "formula" found under
New York law, which used the "unlawful or fraudulent" language. 173 When the
Revised Model Act embraced New York's version of the appraisal exclusivity
provision in 1984, the New York courts had yet to define the parameters of their
rule. In late November of 1984, however, the New York Court of Appeals in
Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corporation'74 undertook to "prescribe a standard
for evaluating the validity of a [cash-out] merger."' 175 Decided just over a year
after Delaware's Weinberger decision, 176 Alpert followed Weinberger's lead in
perpetuating the "entire fairness" test with its two aspects of fair price and fair
dealing. Significantly, however, Alpert disagreed with Weinberger's rejection of
the business purpose rule. 177 In doing so, the court noted that a majority share-
holder must treat all shareholders equally and also must provide good, prudent
management of the corporation; otherwise he has breached his fiduciary duty. 178
"When a breach offiduciary duty occurs, that action will be considered unlawful
and the aggrieved shareholder may be entitled to equitable relief."' 179 Based on
its entire fairness analysis and its application of the business purpose test as a
separate independent standard, the New York Court of Appeals found no
breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholder and upheld the transac-
tion.180 According to the court, full disclosure of all material information to
173. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1986); see supra note 96.
174. 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984).
175. Id. at 566-67, 473 N.E.2d at 24, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 131-57 for a discussion of Weinberger.
177. Alpert, 63 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77.
178. Id. at 572, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
179. Id. at 569, 473 N.E.2d at 26, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 574,473 N.E.2d at 29,483 N.Y.S.2d at 677. In Alpert, the majority shareholders sold
their interests in 79 Realty Corp. to the defendant for a price equal to their proportionate ownership
in the corporation's major asset, a New York City office building. Id. at 563, 473 N.E.2d at 22, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 670. Significantly, defendants promised the former owners to purchase the minority
shareholders' stock under the same terms within four months. Id. Defendants kept their promise,
seeking to cash-out the minority shareholders at this previously negotiated arm's-length price. Id. at
566, 473 N.E.2d at 24, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 672. In undertaking to consummate the merger, defendants
disclosed all relevant procedural and financial aspects of the merger, including their conflict of inter-
est and their plan to cash-out plaintiffs, as well as their ultimate goal to dissolve 79 Realty Corp., the
target corporation, after the merger and thereafter operate it as a partnership. Id. at 564, 473
N.E.2d at 22-23, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 671. Minority shareholders sued, alleging among other things,
that the merger had no legitimate business purpose. Id. at 564-65, 473 N.E.2d at 23, 483 N.Y.S.2d
at 671. The plaintiffs further contended that "essential financial information was not disclosed and
that the value offered for the minority shares was understated and determined in an unfair manner."
Id.
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plaintiffs, who also'had access to corporate books, 18 1 satisfied the fair dealing
aspect of the test. Similarly, because the stock purchase price was tied to the fair
market value of the office building, which greatly exceeded the stock's book
value and the corporation's past and present earnings, 18 2 the court concluded
that the plaintiffs received a fair price.18 3
The court then stated that "[flair dealing and fair price alone will not
render the merger acceptable.... There exists a fiduciary duty to treat all share-
holders equally." 184 The court acknowledged that in a cash-out merger the
majority treats the minority differently: the majority enjoys continued equity
participation in the surviving corporation, while minority shareholders must
surrender their shares for cash.185 Despite the fiduciary duty to treat all share-
holders equally, the "majority shareholders.., have an overriding duty to pro-
vide good and prudent management."' 186 Thus, "'departure from precisely
uniform treatment of stockholders may be justified... where a bona fide busi-
ness purpose indicates that the best interest of the corporation would be
served.' "187 The New York Court of Appeals declined to follow the Delaware
Supreme Court and retained the business purpose rule.' 88 Applying the busi-
ness purpose test to Alpert, the court found that defendants' claimed purpose of
attracting additional capital to effect needed repairs to the building was
sufficient. 189
The Alpert decision, handed down after Weinberger, is New York's inter-
pretation of the exclusivity "formula" as followed by the Revised Model Act.
Notably, the Alpert opinion retains the business purpose rule in its interpretation
of the "unlawful or fraudulent" language. This interpretation adds more com-
plexity to the exclusivity issue, given the dichotomy set up by the Revised Model
Act's use of the New York language and its reference in commentary to Wein-
berger.190 The decision also sets clear precedent that a breach of fiduciary duty,
181. Id. at 574, 473 N.E.2d at 29, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
182. Id. at 566, 473 N.E.2d at 24, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
183. In addition, the price offered to the plaintiffs equalled the price offered to the former major-
ity shareholder, and, as such, represented arm's-length negotiations. Id.
184. Id. at 572, 473 N.E.2d at 27-28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
185. Id. at 572, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 492, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d
122, 126 (1975)).
188. The Alpert court stated that the rule requires a finding that "some" business purpose exists
that "confer[s] some general gain upon the corporation." Id. at 573, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d
at 676. However, the purpose need not be a "strong and compelling" one. Id. at 565, 473 N.E.2d at
23, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 671. Moreover, such a finding will not be defeated merely by the fact that the
corporate objective could have been accomplished in another way. Id. at 573, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 676-77; see also Leader v. Hycor, 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985) (court placed
an additional burden on the minority shareholder by stating that once the majority shareholder
demonstrated such a purpose, the minority shareholder must then show that the majority share-
holder could have achieved the same objective through an alternative method less harmful to minor-
ity shareholders).
189. Defendant offered several business purposes behind its two-step merger and eventual disso-
lution of the corporation into a partnership, one of which was the tax advantage of operating the
business as a partnership. Alpert, 63 N.Y.2d at 566, 473 N.E.2d at 23-24, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
190. See supra note 102.
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as determined by the entire fairness and business purpose rules, is "unlawful"
and entitles a minority shareholder to equitable relief beyond the appraisal
remedy.
3. States Adopting the Revised Model Act's Appraisal Exclusivity Provision
Since the Revised Model Act was adopted in 1984 by the American Bar
Association, twelve states have adopted some version of the Revised Model
Act's appraisal exclusivity provision.191 Nine states have incorporated verbatim
the Revised Model Act's specific statutory language limiting the dissenting
shareholder to an appraisal proceeding unless "unlawful or fraudulent" actions
occur. An examination of how the remaining three states have treated the Re-
vised Model Act's exclusivity provision reveals stridently different approaches.
Indiana's statute has an absolute exclusivity provision which omits the "un-
lawful or fraudulent" language found in the Revised Model Act.192 By deleting
that language, the Indiana Legislature expressly rejected 193 the Indiana Supreme
Court's decision in Gabhart v. Gabhart.194 Gabhart had interpreted former Indi-
ana law as allowing a merger to be attacked if done without a "valid purpose,"
notwithstanding the language of Indiana's former exclusivity provision. 195
191. To date, sixteen state legislatures have adopted the Revised Model Act's provisions regard-
ing dissenters' rights, forcing each to consider the exclusivity provision found in § 13.02(b). Of
these, twelve state legislatures adopted some form of the provision. The following state statutes
contain the specific "unlawful or fraudulent" language: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-1302(B) (Supp.
1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1302(5) (West Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 490.1302(2) (Supp. 1990);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.13-020(2) (Michie 1989); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762(3)
(West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 794-13.02(b) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.554(2) (Supp. 1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102(b) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(B) (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 17-
16-1302(b) (1989). On April 23, 1990, Wisconsin enacted major revisions to its corporate laws to be
effective January 1, 1991. The new Act substantially follows the Revised Model Act. In its appraisal
exclusivity provision, Wisconsin follows the "unlawful or fraudulent" exception to the exclusivity
found in the Revised Model Act. Wisconsin includes an additional exception, however, which refer-
ences the power of the court to grant equitable relief for shareholders of statutory close corporations.
See Act of April 23, 1990, No. 303, § 180.1302, 1990 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1855, 1924-25 (West). On
July 13, 1990, the Missouri legislature made substantial revisions to its corporate code, one of which
was to adopt the "unlawful or fraudulent" language as in the Revised Model Act's appraisal exclu-
sivity provision. Act of July 13, 1990, § 351.875(2), 1990 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1310, 1336 (Vernon).
Two state statutes contain the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision with some variation of the
"unlawful or fraudulent" language. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302(b) (1989) (unless non-compliance
with "procedural requirements ... or the vote required to obtain approval of the corporate action
was obtained by fraudulent and deceptive means" (emphasis added)); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.13.020(2) (Supp. 1990) (unless the corporate action fails to comply with "procedural require-
ments ... or is fraudulent" (emphasis added)). The Indiana statute contains the Revised Model
Act's exclusivity provision but omits the "unlawful or fraudulent" language, making the appraisal
remedy exclusive. IND. CODE § 23-1-44-8(c) (1989). The South Carolina statute adopts the Revised
Model Act's provisions on dissenters' rights that delineate which corporate actions give rise to the
right of dissent and appraisal, but it omits the exclusivity provision altogether. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-13-102 reporters' comments (Law. Co-op. 1990).
192. IND. CODE § 23-1-44-8(c) (1989). "A shareholder ... [w]ho is entitled to dissent and
obtain payment for the shareholder's shares under this chapter... may not chadlenge the corporate
action creating ... the shareholder's entitlement." Id.
193. Id., official comment.
194. 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977) (holding that a minority shareholder could challenge a
cash-out merger as a "de facto" dissolution if the merger lacked a "valid purpose," construed by the
court to mean "a purpose intended to advance a corporate interest").
195. When Gabhart was decided, the exclusivity provision provided that "[e]very shareholder
who did not vote in favor of such merger or exchange and who does not object in writing and
1991)
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Although Gabhart recognized the business purpose test, it rejected the then-
leading Delaware case of Singer v. Magnavox Company196 as too expansive in its
application of the entire fairness test. The court stated that "[w]e do not believe
the judiciary should intrude into corporate management to that extent." 197
Although Indiana's judicial standard of review incorporated the business pur-
pose test for mergers but not the entire fairness test, the new statute makes the
provision absolutely exclusive. The new statute excludes both tests and abso-
lutely prohibits an equitable injunction.198
The Indiana Commission explained the statutory reversal of Gabhart in its
official comments by stating that the Gabhart decision created "substantial un-
certainty" and disrupted corporate transactions that otherwise were authorized
by law.19 9 Described in the official comments as a "categorical statutory rule"
that dissenting shareholders may not challenge the corporate action period, Indi-
ana's appraisal exclusivity provision is intended as an absolutely exclusive, non-
challengeable appraisal remedy.
200
At the other extreme is the South Carolina legislature's treatment of the
appraisal exclusivity issue. Although the statute follows the Revised Model Act
in providing dissenting shareholders with an appraisal remedy, it does not incor-
porate the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision to limit the availability of
the appraisal remedy in any way. 20 Stating in its official comments that such an
inclusion was "undesirable," 20 2 the South Carolina legislature opted for a non-
exclusive appraisal remedy.
A final illustration of the differences among the jurisdictions that adopted
demand payment of the value of his shares at the time and in the manner aforesaid shall be conclu-
sively presumed to have assented to such merger or exchange." IND. CODE § 23-1-5-7 (1972) (re-
placed by IND. CODE § 23-1-44-8(c) (1989)).
196. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
197. Gabhart, 267 Ind. at 388, 370 N.E.2d at 356 (emphasis added).
198. However, one commentator argues that where the minority shareholder is an owner and
employee in a closely-held corporation, the Indiana courts may be inclined to protect his active
investor/employee's expectation interests when the majority has breached its fiduciary duty. Note,
Dissenting Shareholders' Rights Under the Indiana Business Corporation Act: Jurisprudential Inter-
pretations of the Exclusivity Provision, 21 IND. L. REV. 931, 946-54 (1988).
199. The official comments to the Indiana Code revealed that the legislators:
believed the [Gabhart] decision created substantial uncertainty about whether and to what
extent minority shareholders could seek to enjoin or undo corporate transactions author-
ized by statute and approved by the majority. Given the potential for disruption of corpo-
rate transactions [under the Gabhart] rule, the General Assembly adopted subsection (c) as
a categorical statutory rule that shareholders entitled to dissenters' rights may not chal-
lenge the corporate action creating that entitlement.
IND. CODE § 23-1-44-8(c) official comments (1989).
200. But see Note, supra note 198, at 948-50 ("Indiana courts place a high value upon fiduciary
duty between both directors and shareholders," so that an active shareholder in a close corporation
may persuade a court to protect his shareholder expectations and enjoin a cash-out merger where a
majority shareholder breaches his fiduciary duty or makes misrepresentations.).
201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102 (Law. Co-op. 1990); see supra text accompanying note 94.
202. The South Carolina reporters' comments state:
Subsection (b) of the 1984 Model Act section contains a provision attempting to limit
judicial scrutiny of corporate actions that give rise to dissenters' rights. There was nothing
similar in prior South Carolina law, and it is not included in the new provision because it
would probably be largely ineffective and is undesirable.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102 reporters' comments 2 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
[Vol. 69
APPRAISAL REMEDY
the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision is Georgia's statute, which adopts
a compromise position between absolute exclusivity and non-exclusivity.
Although not using the Revised Model Act's "unlawful or fraudulent" language,
the Georgia provision retained these two exceptions to exclusivity by clearly
specifying the meaning of these terms.20 3
In its original enactment of the Revised Model Act's exclusivity provision,
the Georgia legislature limited the term "unlawful" to procedural violations of
corporate law only.2°4 This alteration was the only material modification to the
Revised Model Act language until the Georgia legislature later amended the
statute to similarly limit the term "fraudulent."
In its original language, the Georgia exclusivity provision precluded minor-
ity shareholders from claiming that any action constituting a fiduciary breach
was "unlawful." As emphasized in the official comments to the 1988 original
enactment, the "fact that the merger might be... unlawful as a breach of the
directors' duty of care is not ground for equitable relief at the instance of a
shareholder. ' 20 5 Thus, the Georgia lawmakers chose to limit unlawfulness ex-
plicitly to strictly procedural violations.
Although the Georgia legislature took pains to limit its original enactment
of the Revised Model Act's term "unlawful" to procedural corporate violations,
the term "fraudulent" remained intact. One year later, however, Georgia
lawmakers amended this section20 6 by replacing the word "fraudulent" with
language specifying "the nature of 'fraud' that would permit collateral chal-
lenges to the corporate action."'20 7 By limiting fraud to circumstances surround-
ing the approval vote, Georgia legislators restricted fraud to procedural matters,
203. Georgia's exclusivity provision presently provides that:
A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this article may
not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement unless the corporate action fails
to comply with procedural requirements of this chapter or the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation or the vote required to obtain approval of the corporate action
was obtained by fraudulent and deceptive means, regardless of whether the shareholder has
exercised dissenter's rights.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302(b) (1989).
204. As originally enacted, the exclusivity provision provided in pertinent part that "[a] share-
holder... may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement unless the action fails to
comply with procedural requirements of this chapter or the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the
corporation or is fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation." Act of April 7,
1988, § 14-2-1302(b), 1988 Ga. Laws 1203 (codified at GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-2-1302(b) (1989)).
205. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302 official comments (Special Pamphlet 1988). The Georgia offi-
cial comments elaborate:
If the corporation attempts an action in violation of the corporation law on voting, in
violation of clauses in articles of incorporation prohibiting it, or by deception of sharehold-
ers-to take some examples-the court's freedom to intervene should be unaffected by the
presence or absence of dissenters' rights under this article.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302 official comments (1989).
Significantly, the official comments to the Georgia Code deleted the reference to "breach of
fiduciary duty" in the official comments to the Revised Model Act. Compare REVISED MODEL AcT
§ 13.02(b) official comment 2 (contains reference to breach of fiduciary duty) with GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-1302 official comments (1989) (deletes breach of fiduciary duty reference).
206. Act of April 10, 1989, § 58, 1989 Ga. Laws 998 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302(b)
(1989)). For specific text of exclusivity provision, see supra note 203.
207. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302 official comments (1989).
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as seen earlier in the "unlawful" limitation.208 Furthermore, by using "fraudu-
lent and deceptive," Georgia lawmakers limited the term "fraud" to "actual
fraud," thereby foreclosing the possible argument that a director's breach of fi-
duciary duty constitutes "constructive fraud," entitling a minority shareholder
to equitable relief.20 9
By restricting the "fraudulent" language to actual deceptive fraud and
thereby eliminating constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty arguments
under the statute, Georgia's exclusivity statute parallels the Santa Fe Industries,
Ina v. Green210 decision. In Santa Fe, the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that a mere breach of fiduciary duty, in the absence of any misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure, does not constitute securities fraud actionable under rule
lOb-5. 211 The court held that a parent corporation, owning ninety-five percent
208. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
209. The official comments explain that:
Because fraud can be 'actual fraud' that involves deception, or 'constructive fraud,' in eq-
uity, that involves some claim of a breach of a fiduciary duty, litigants in some cases have
been permitted to use 'fraud' claims, which are in essence claims that a fiduciary has acted
unfairly, to litigate valuation issues that are appropriately disposed of in appraisal proceed-
ings. Accordingly, the 1989 amendment made it clear that only 'actual fraud,' involving
traditional notions of deception, permits collateral attack on the corporate action.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1302(b) official comments (1989).
The official comments also explain that Georgia follows the approach, but not the language, of
the California exclusivity provision, which makes appraisal exclusive "except in an action to test
whether the number of shares required to authorize or approve the reorganization have been legally
voted." Id. (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
210. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For an excellent discussion ofSanta Fe's significance and an overview
of the cases developing its holding that constructive fraud does not constitute securities fraud under
rule 10b-5, see Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Act's Antifraud Prov-
sions A Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. REV. 819, 819-844 (1979). See also Note,
Pleading Constructive Fraud in Securities Litigation-Avoiding Dismissal for Failure to Plead Fraud
With Particularity, 33 EMORY L.J. 517 (1984); Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty under Rule 10b-5
After Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1874 (1978); Note, Rule 10b-5: The
Circuits Debate the Exclusivity of Remedies, the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, and Constructive De-
ception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877 (1980).
211. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1982), provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
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of its subsidiary, did not violate rule lOb-5 when it acquired the remaining five
percent of the shares in a short-form, cash-out merger. The merger was accom-
plished in accordance with state law procedural requirements without any mis-
representation or material nondisclosure.212 The plaintiff minority shareholder
alleged that he was paid a "wholly inadequate" price in a manner constituting
fraud under rule lOb-5.2 13 However, the court found that a transaction, in
which the majority shareholder disclosed all lawfully required information, is
not within the scope of rule lOb-5's prohibition of "manipulative" or "decep-
tive" practices, even though the transaction was unfair or might constitute con-
structive fraud for breach of fiduciary duty.2 14 The Supreme Court declined to
read rule lOb-5 more broadly so as "to regulate transactions which constitute no
more than internal corporate mismanagement." 2 15 The Court further noted
that although state law traditionally has governed internal corporate affairs, a
uniform federal fiduciary standard may be needed to govern such mergers.2 16
Santa Fe eliminates non-deceptive fiduciary breaches from rule lOb-5 cover-
age.2 17 The explicit language of rule lOb-5 regulates "manipulative or decep-
tive" conduct and, by its narrow definition, extends only to actual fraud, not to
L
212. Under Delaware's short-form merger statute as interpreted in Stauffer (at the time of Santa
Fe, the Singer trilogy had not been handed down) the minority shareholders were compelled to sell
their remaining 5% of the shares back to the merged corporation and were relegated to a court
review of the offered price in an appraisal proceeding as their only remedy. Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78, (1962), overruled by Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d
1032 (Del. 1979), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Plaintiffs in
Santa Fe did not pursue their appraisal remedy in the Delaware courts, but sued in federal court
under a rule lOb-5 theory, seeking to have the merger set aside or to recover what they claimed to be
the fair value of the shares. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466-67. Plaintiffs attacked the merger price as
"wholly inadequate" because it was based on a "fraudulent appraisal" of the stock at $100 per share,
obtained by Santa Fe after it knew the fair market value of the company's assets had been appraised
at $772 per share. Id. at 467. However, the Court found that the majority had made full and fair
disclosure of these and all other relevant facts such that rule 10b-5 was not violated. Id. at 474.
213. Id. at 467.
214. Id. at 470-74, 477. Noting that the words "manipulative or deceptive" appear in the stat-
ute, the Court declared, with regard to "manipulative":
No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used
to manipulate securities prices. But we do not think it would have chosen this "term of
art" if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate mismanage-
ment such as this, in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated
unfairly by a fiduciary.
Id. at 477. Regarding "deceptive," the Court stated:
To the extent that the [lower court] would rely on the use of the term "fraud" in Rule lOb-
5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
securities transaction, its interpretation would... 'add a gloss to the operative language of
the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.'
Id. at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
215. Id. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)).
216. Id. at 479-80. Commentators suggest that this comment spurred Delaware, among other
states, to reevaluate its lax enforcement of directors and controlling shareholders' fiduciary duties in
mergers. See authorities cited supra note 108.
217. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 1977) (nondisclosure of a fiduciary breach
itself constitutes a violation of rule lOb-5 if an injunction might have been obtained in state court to
prevent the alleged breach, had it been disclosed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See Note,
Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Breaches of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REV. 765 (1978).
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constructive fraud.2 18 Fiduciary breaches constituting constructive fraud are
fraudulent but are not deceptive and cannot be outlawed under rule lOb-5.
The Georgia legislature acknowledged in its official comments that fiduci-
ary breaches entail constructive fraud, but like the United States Supreme
Court's Santa Fe interpretation limiting rule lOb-5 to actual deception, re-
stricted the term "fraudulent" under the Revised Model Act's appraisal exclu-
sivity provision to actual deception. 2 19 In sum, Georgia limits both exceptions
to procedural matters: (1) unlawfulness is restricted to procedural violations of
the corporate code, corporate charter or bylaws; (2) fraud is restricted to proce-
dure by language requiring that the merger approval vote not be obtained by
fraudulent and deceptive means. Thus, the Georgia exclusivity statute precludes
a minority shareholder from enjoining a merger based on the argument that a
fiduciary breach by the directors or controlling shareholder is either unlawful or
fraudulent.
4. States That Have Not Adopted the Revised Model Act
Many states that have not adopted the Revised Model Act have an ap-
praisal exclusivity provision in their corporate codes paralleling the Revised
Model Act's terms. Among these, Massachusetts is noteworthy. 220 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified the standard of review that
applies in evaluating cash-out mergers under the Massachusetts statute in Cog-
gins v. New England Patriots Football Club.221 The court considered this issue
after Weinberger and rejected Delaware's deletion of the independent business
purpose test but retained Delaware's delineation of the entire fairness test.222
218. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (By the United States
Supreme Court's statement interpreting its past decisions pertaining to the term "manipulative" in
rule lOb-5 as requiring "misrepresentation" or nondisclosure, the Court arguably reads the term
"manipulative" out of the rule.).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
220. The Massachusetts exclusivity statute provides that:
The enforcement by a stockholder of his right to receive payment for his shares ... shall be
an exclusive remedy except that this chapter shall not exclude the right of such stockholder
to bring or maintain an appropriate proceeding to obtain relief on the ground that such
corporate action will be or is illegal or fraudulent as to him.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 98 (1979).
221. 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986). In Coggins the minority shareholder was the
owner of ten shares of nonvoting common stock. Id. at 529, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. Being an avid
Patriots fan, however, he was enraged when the 100% voting stock shareholder of the New England
Patriots attempted to cash him out. Id. at 527, 492 N.E.2d at 1114. He desired only to void the
merger nearly ten years after it was consummated. Id. at 529, 535, 492 N.E.2d at 1115-16, 1119.
The Patriots owner, having taken on significant personal debt in acquiring 100% ownership, under-
took the cash-out merger in an attempt to reorganize the Patriots so that the corporation would be
devoted to the repayment of these personal loans. Id. at 526-28, 492 N.E.2d at 1114-15. This, in
effect, was the purpose underlying the elimination of the nonvoting shares in the cash-out merger.
222. The court stated:
We note that the "fairness" test to which the Delaware court now has adhered [in Wein-
berger] is ... closely related to the views expressed in our decisions. Unlike the Delaware
court [in Weinberger], however, we believe that the "business-purpose" test is an additional
useful means under our statutes and case law for examining a transaction in which a con-
trolling stockholder eliminates the minority interest in a corporation. This concept of fair
dealing is not limited to close corporations but applies to judicial review of cash freeze-out
mergers.
[Vol. 69
APPRAISAL REMEDY
Declaring that "the dangers of self-dealing and abuse of fiduciary duty are
greatest in freeze-out situations," 223 the court held that the motives and behav-
iors of the controlling shareholder should be examined with closest scrutiny
under the entire fairness and business purpose tests to assure that the controlling
shareholder does not violate fiduciary principles governing the relationship be-
tween the majority and minority.224 Citing Pupecki v. James Madison Corpora-
tion225 and Leader v. Hycor, !nC 2 26 among other precedent cases, the court
further held that "[t]he court is justified in exercising its equitable power when a
violation of fiduciary duty is claimed."'227
As to the instant case, the court found no legitimate business purpose be-
cause the owner had intended only to benefit himself personally as majority
shareholder. 228 Therefore, the court did not need to deliberate further over the
elements of fairness for a transaction without a valid corporate purpose.229 Es-
sentially, the business purpose test operated as a threshold hurdle that control-
ling shareholders had to scale in addition to the "entire fairness" test. The court
awarded rescissory damages for a merger that had occurred ten years earlier.2 30
C. Close Corporation Minority Shareholders: A Special Breed
Under the new Act, the right of dissent and appraisal exists for sharehold-
ers who resist certain fundamental corporate changes. 231 As the Drafting Com-
mittee acknowledged, the predicament of the close corporation shareholder
merits special consideration in evaluating the exclusiveness and appropriateness
of the appraisal remedy.232 Any legal and equitable rights given to dissenting
shareholders under the new Act take on added significance in protecting the
rights and interests of close corporation minority shareholders because these
shareholders are particularly susceptible to being squeezed out by the control-
ling shareholder.2 33 Forced liquidation of the minority's shares by the control-
Id. at 531, 492 N.E.2d at 1117 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 532, 492 N.E.2d at 1117.
224. Id. at 533, 492 N.E.2d at 1117-18.
225. 376 Mass. 212, 216-17, 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (1978) (when controlling shareholder failed
to assure that corporation received adequate consideration for its assets, transaction was illegal or
fraudulent and appraisal exclusivity provision did not foreclose review).
226. 395 Mass. 215, 221,479 N.E.2d 173, 177 (1985) (judicial review is appropriate for claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and unfairness).
227. Coggins, 397 Mass. at 532, 492 N.E.2d at 1117.
228. Id. at 534-35, 492 N.E.2d at 1118-19.
229. Id. at 535, 492 N.E.2d at 1119.
230. Id. at 535-37, 492 N.E.2d at 1119-20.
231. N.C. GaN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(1)-(5) (1990).
232. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
233. O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 121, 121-39 (1986-87) [hereinafter Protecting Minority Rights]; see also O'NEAL's CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS, supra note 10, § 8.07 (discussing various direct and indirect methods by which control-
ling shareholders squeeze out minority shareholders from close corporations, the disadvantage of
illiquidity in a close corporation, and the fact that "relationships which often exist among partici-
pants in a close corporation increase the potential for a squeeze-out"). See generally F. O'NEAL &
R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 2 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS] (discussing various reasons underlying
squeeze-outs).
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ling shareholder has been characterized as "private eminent domain."'234 As one
commentator explained, "[t]he forced taking of one person's property by an-
other, even at a fair price, is a substantial invasion of property ownership
rights."2 35 Allowing the majority shareholder to elect at any time to buy out the
minority shareholder may unfairly burden the minority shareholder.
Because the stock of a close corporation, by definition, is not publicly
traded, the close-corporation shareholder suffers illiquidity risks that a share-
holder of a public corporation does not.23 6 In the close corporation context
when the majority shareholder forces out the minority shareholders, the close-
corporation shareholder has no ready market price by which to value his
shares.2 37 In addition to suffering from the illiquidity and valuation difficulties
created by its lack of a public market, the equity investment of a close-
corporation shareholder differs in nature from that of a publicly traded corpora-
tion shareholder.238 Often ownership in the corporation is not just another in-
vestment for the close-corporation shareholder but is a major commitment of his
personal capital.2 39 A close-corporation shareholder typically will be involved
heavily in the daily activities of the company as officer, employee, or director.
2 4°
Indeed, he may wear any or all of these hats, while the publicly traded corpora-
tion shareholder typically wears none.24 1 The dividends or the salary the close
234. Vorenberg, supra note 96, at 1191.
235. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22
WAKE FORST L REv. 9, 31 (1987).
236. See Protecting Minority Rights, supra note 233, at 123; O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINOR-
Iry SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 233, § 2:15; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 291,
307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1983) ("[Ihe illiquidity of a minority shareholder's interest in a close corpora-
tion renders him vulnerable to exploitation by the majority shareholders.").
237. O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 10, § 1.07, at 26-27. Related to valuation
difficulties is the controversial issue of whether a controlling or majority shareholder who cashes out
the minority shareholder in a freeze-out merger can price the cash-out transaction at a valuation that
adjusts the minority shares for the so-called "minority discount." See Note, supra note 38, at 280
(concluding that "[w]ithout the minority discount, the appraisal remedy more effectively safeguards
against bad faith and coercion by majority shareholders"). A "minority discount" is an adjustment
to the pro-rata value of shares that lowers the value of the minority block because the minority
shareholders lack corporate decision-making power over corporate policy, the payment of dividends,
and employment compensation, among other factors. Id. at 260; Harris, Valuation of Closely Held
Partnerships and Corporations: Recent Developments Concerning Minority Interests and Lack of
Marketability Discounts, 42 ARK. L. Rav. 649, 660 (1989). See Comment, Valuing Closely Held
Stock- Control Premiums and Minority Discounts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139, 145 (1982).
Because the "minority discount" issue arises in valuing both public and close corporation
shares, a close corporation shareholder effectively suffers two discounts: a "minority discount," be-
cause the shares do not give the buyer a controlling interest in the enterprise, and a "marketability
discount," another adjustment made specifically to closely held shares because of the illiquidity risks
inherent in such stock. "The discount for lack of marketability is distinct from the minority interest
discount, even though judicial decisions sometimes blur the two." Harris, supra, at 659.
238. Comment, The Strict Good Faith Standard-Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in
Close Corporations, 33 MERCER L. REv. 595, 595 (1982); Note, Oklahoma Close Corporations: A
Need to Recognize Shareholder Expectations, 11 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 357, 360 (1986).
239. Bulloch, Heightened Fiduciary Duties in Closely Held Corporations: Donahue Revisited, 16
PAC. L.J. 935, 938 (1985); see Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass.
578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
240. See Comment, supra note 238, at 595-96; Note, Close Corporations: Strict Good Faith Fidu-
ciary Duty Applied to Controlling Stockholders, 38 LA. L. REv. 214, 215 (1977).
241. See Comment, supra note 238, at 596 (In a public corporation the board of directors, as
management, sets the business policy and oversees daily operations of the company while the share-
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corporation shareholder receives often represents his major source of income.2 42
Two additional concerns common to all minority shareholders generally
plague the close corporation shareholder: tax liability and search costs. First,
the majority shareholder in buying out the minority forces the minority to real-
ize any tax gains or losses on the sale of his shares at possibly an unfavorable
time.243 Furthermore, a cash-out merger effected by the majority forces the mi-
nority to incur the inconvenience and search costs of finding an alternative, but
equally satisfying investment. 244
Because of the vulnerability of the close corporation shareholder, general
common-law principles recognize that the controlling shareholder of a close cor-
poration owes the minority shareholder a higher245 fiduciary duty than usual.
This duty requires that the majority or controlling shareholders " 'exercise good
faith, care and diligence' to make the property of the corporation produce the
largest possible amount, [and] to protect the interests of the [minority share-
holder]'" by securing and paying over to them "'their just proportion of the
holders, as owners, have the right to vote at shareholders' meetings and potentially veto actions
taken by directors on fundamental corporate matters.).
242. See Comment, supra note 238, at 595; Note, supra note 240, at 215; see also Note, A Statu-
tory Proposal Protecting Employment Expectations of a Close Corporation's Minority Shareholders, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 545, 547 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Protecting Employment Expectations] Mhe minor-
ity shareholder often expects the corporation to employ him on a full-time basis; if discharged, he
may lose his means of livelihood as well as his investment in the company.).
243. Hetherington, supra note 235, at 31 (discussing tax liability and search costs incurred by
both close and public corporation shareholders). The Drafting Committee also discussed tax liabil-
ity in trying to craft the meaning of "fair value" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(3) (1990). North
Carolina Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 7 (December 21, 1987). The
Drafting Committee considered providing that in a " 'squeeze-out, cash-out' situation the appraiser
could consider... tax consequences and any collateral benefits the 'cashed out' shareholders derived
from participation in the corporation's ownership." Id. However, the sentiment surfaced that
"since the shareholder would eventually have to recognize a gain from the shares and be taxed on
any gain, allowing for tax consequences [as a part of the fair value in a cash-out merger] would in
effect overcompensate the shareholder." Id. Thus, the Drafting Committee finally agreed to leave
the definition of "fair value" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(3) as it appeared in the Revised
Model Act. Id. at 10.
244. See Hetherington, supra note 235, at 31.
245. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 593-94, 328
N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (1975) (contrasting the fiduciary duty that stockholders of a close corporation
owe one another with the "somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and
stockholders of all corporations must adhere"); see Bulloch, supra note 239, at 939, 955 (concluding
that the Donahue case was "well reasoned and correctly decided because the Donahue court pro-
foundly grasped the peculiarities of life in a closely held corporation" where the majority sharehold-
ers could use their power to "freeze out" the minority); see generally Comment, supra note 238, at
612-13 (discussing the expansion of fiduciary duty of close majority shareholders in Donahue to
impose a fiduciary duty upon minority shareholders under Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12
Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981) in their use of any veto power they enjoy). The North
Carolina Supreme Court first applied a fiduciary duty to a majority shareholder of a close corpora-
tion in Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951). In that case, a minority
shareholder sought an injunction to prevent the proposed issuance of additional stock, which would
have diluted his interest in the corporation. Id. at 344, 67 S.E.2d at 353. The court held that a
complaint alleging that the majority shareholders failed to pay dividends to the minority shareholder
to render his stock worthless and to freeze him out of the corporation stated a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, for which equitable relief was appropriate. Id. at 345-47, 67 S.E.2d at 354-55; see also
Note, Shareholder Agreements-Oral Agreements in Close Quarters--Penley v. Penley, 22 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 147, 157 (1987) ("Because the by-laws and charters of many close corporations do
not reflect the total business bargain, a higher standard of fiduciary duty is required to protect the
minority shareholders.").
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income and of the proceeds of the corporate property.' ",246 In essence, the fidu-
ciary duty proscribes self-serving conduct by controlling shareholders. 247 The
new North Carolina Business Corporation Act retains the fiduciary duty doc-
trine24 8 and the "reasonable expectations" 24 9 doctrine the North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted in Meiselman v. Meiselman,250 which both serve to pro-
tect the minority shareholder. Under the former judicial dissolution statute, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Meiselman held that the "rights or interests"
of the minority shareholder that are protected by the court are his "reasonable
expectations." 251 The court must "examin[e] the entire history of the partici-
246. Gaines, 234 N.C. at 338, 67 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting 13 AM. JUR. CORPORATIONS § 423
(1938)).
247. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 589, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
248. The express statutory mandate under former North Carolina law that "directors and of-
ficers shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders" has
been deleted from the new Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-8-30 (1990)). The drafters recommended that the North Carolina General Assembly follow the
Revised Model Act's verbatim language on the issue of directors' standard of conduct, which has no
reference to a "fiduciary" duty but instead codifies the business judgment rule. See infra notes 293-
94 and accompanying text. The General Assembly deleted the word "fiduciary" from the new Act.
However, the North Carolina Commentary to the new Act state that "there is no intent to change
North Carolina law in this area... or to modify in any way the duty of directors recognized under
the former law." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 official comments. Thus, under the new Act, share-
holders in a close corporation who also serve as officers or as directors of the company will continue
to bear a fiduciary duty to the corporation and all its shareholders, including the minority sharehold-
ers. See infra text accompanying notes 293-301.
249. By deleting the Revised Model Act's "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent" language, the gen-
eral assembly retained the wording from North Carolina's former dissolution provision-"the rights
or interests of the complaining shareholder"-which the North Carolina Supreme Court construed
in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983), to mean the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the shareholder. Id. at 296-300, 307 S.E.2d at 562-63. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125(a)(4) (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (1990)) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
14-30(2)(ii) (1990). For a good general discussion of the changes made by the general assembly to
the new judicial dissolution provision and the effect upon the Meiselman decision, see Note, Minority
Shareholders' Rights in the Close Corporation Under the New North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, 68 N.C.L. REv. 1109, 1119-26 (1990). The Note observes that "[i]ncluding the language 'liqui-
dation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holder' in the new Act constitutes clear evidence of legislative intent to maintain the existing
Meiselman standard." Id. at 1119.
250. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); see also Note, Corporation Law-Meiselman v. Mei-
selman: "Reasonable Expectations" Determine Minority Shareholders' Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 999,
1021-22 (1984) ("Like the reasonable expectations test, [the] fiduciary duty operates to protect mi-
nority interests by limiting the exercise of majority control.... [R]easonable expectations should
include a fiduciary duty owed the minority by the majority."). Although the general assembly re-
tained the "rights or interests" language as construed by the Meiselman decision, it deleted the
alternate relief provision provided under the former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 125.1. This alteration may
decrease the court's flexibility in giving effect to the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Note,
supra note 249, at 1120 ("The final part of the Meiselman test-the requirement that the shareholder
show that he 'is entitled to some form of equitable relief'-will change under the new Act.").
251. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 301-06, 307 S.E.2d at 565-67. The "reasonable expectations" doc-
trine was followed by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63,
473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984). The highest courts in Alaska, Montana, North Dakota
and West Virginia also have adopted "reasonable expectations" as a guide to the meaning of "op-
pression" under their involuntary dissolution statutes while some states have codified judicial consid-
eration of the shareholder's "reasonable expectations" in their dissolution statutes. O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 10, ch. 9, § 9.30, at 142-43 (citing Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d
443 (Alaska 1985); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Balvik v. Sylves-
ter, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 164 W. Va. 241, 262 S.E,2d 433
(1980)).
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pants' relationship" 252 to ascertain the minority shareholder's "understandings,
express or implied," as they developed and changed during the course of his
dealings with the majority shareholder. 253 Beyond the traditional expectation of
increased share value, the Meiselman rule arguably protects reasonable expecta-
tions of continued employment as well. 2 54 Thus, under a squeeze-play tactic2 55
in Meiselman, where the controlling shareholder's actions forced the minority
shareholder to seek judicial intervention, the North Carolina Supreme Court
recognized broad protection for close corporation shareholders' rights. The pre-
cedent set in Meiselman illustrates the possible degree of minority protection
North Carolina courts may render in the squeeze-out merger2 56 context to pro-
tect shareholders' reasonable expectations regarding their continued equity in-
vestment in an enterprise. 25 7
Significantly, the General Statutes Commission originally incorporated into
the North Carolina official comments a statement that "reasonable expecta-
tions" be considered in evaluating the fairness of the cash-out merger258 but
later deleted the statement because "reasonable expectations" had "never before
been considered in connection with a cash-out merger," making it "improper to
tell the court what it could and could not take into account. '259
Given the many differences between public and close corporations, the
higher fiduciary duty placed upon close corporation majority shareholders, and
the illiquidity and valuation difficulties of close corporations, the issue of
appraisal exclusivity takes on added importance to a close-corporation
shareholder.
252. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
253. Id.
254. See Note, supra note 245, at 156 ("In Meiselman, the good-faith firing of the minority
shareholder was not a defense when the minority shareholder had a reasonable expectation of em-
ployment and participation in the management of the corporation."), see Note, Protecting Employ-
ment Expectations, supra note 242, at 556-59.
255. Denied profits diverted into a corporation set up by the majority shareholder and later
stripped of his employee status, the minority shareholder in Meiselman sought a buy-out of his
shares at their fair value under the former judicial dissolution and alternative relief statutes. Meisel-
man, 309 N.C. at 283-87, 297-98, 307 S.E.2d at 554-56, 562; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 125(a)(4),
§ 125.1 (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30, 55-13-31 (1990)). A judicial dissolution
arises when the minority shareholder seeks to exit his equity investment. The appraisal remedy and
the extent of its exclusivity arises when the minority shareholder seeks equitable relief to enjoin a
cash-out merger and retain his equity investment. Both remedies allow minority shareholders to
seek judicial intervention when their rights are violated by the majority. See O'NEAi'S CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS, supra note 10, ch. 8, § 8.07, at 64 & ch. 9, § 9.02, at 5-6.
256. See supra note 10.
257. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 11 (October 28, 1987) (Commit-
tee member "pointed out that it can be argued that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the
majority shareholders squeeze out a minority shareholder because the minority shareholders have a
reasonable expectation to remain in the corporation and to continue with their investment.").
258. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 8 (February 5, 1988). The Statutes Commission
directed that a statement be included in the North Carolina official comments suggesting that "rea-
sonable expectations" could be considered in determining whether an action was "grossly inequita-
ble." Later, at the urging of the Drafting Committee, the Statutes Commission decided that "while
it did not want to foreclose consideration of "reasonable expectations," it also did not want to force
such consideration and agreed to the omission of a specific reference to "reasonable expectations."
Id. at 5 (December 2, 1988). The general assembly eventually deleted the "grossly inequitable"
language itself from the provisions. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
259. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 5 (December 2, 1988).
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D. Resolution of the Appraisal Exclusivity Issue in North Carolina
Because the recently enacted North Carolina appraisal exclusivity statute
left the meaning of "unlawful" and "fraudulent" open to judicial interpretation,
the North Carolina courts could follow a number of approaches to decide the
appropriate standard of review for evaluating cash-out mergers. In light of the
special plight of close corporation minority shareholders, this standard takes on
added importance when applied in the close corporation context.260 Whether
the courts will read these terms to encompass a breach of fiduciary duty and
whether the courts will incorporate the business purpose test as well as the entire
fairness test into the standard of review adopted for cash-out mergers will deter-
mine the degree of protection afforded the minority shareholder facing a cash-
out merger in North Carolina. For guidance, the North Carolina judiciary can
rely upon North Carolina cases governing fiduciary breaches in similar con-
texts2 61 Massachusetts 262 and New York263 cases that construe "unlawful" and
"fraudulant" to encompass a breach of fiduciary duty and the business purpose
test.
III. APPROACHES NORTH CAROLINA COURTS MAY TAKE IN CRAFTING A
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CASH-OUT MERGERS
A. A Breach of Fiduciary Duty is "Fraudulent"
As interpreted in North Carolina case law, fraud may arise when plaintiffs
have reposed a special confidence in the defendant that creates a fiduciary rela-
tionship.264 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[c]onstructive fraud differs from
active fraud in that the intent to deceive is not an essential element, but it is
nevertheless fraud though it rests upon presumption arising from breach offiduci-
ary obligation rather than deception intentionally practiced.'265 Constructive
fraud is presumed from the breach of a fiduciary duty; it does not require inten-
tional deception or actual dishonesty.266 Indeed, constructive fraud is "a breach
of [fiduciary] duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent
because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to injure public
interests.) 2 67
North Carolina courts long have recognized that certain fiduciary relation-
ships raise a presumption of fraud. Examples of such relationships include at-
torney-client, principal-agent, trustees of trust funds, and executors who are
principal beneficiaries under wills. 2 6 8 In 1951 in Gaines v. Long Manufacturing
260. See supra text accompanying notes 231-59.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 264-83.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 220-30.
263. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
264. McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943).
265. Miller v. First Nat'l Bank of Catawba County, 234 N.C. 309, 316, 67 S.E.2d 362, 367
(1951) (emphasis added).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. McNeill, 223 N.C. at 181, 25 S.E.2d at 616.
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Co., the North Carolina Supreme Court held that majority shareholders of a
close corporation owe minority shareholders a fiduciary duty, stating that "ac-
tual fraud or mismanagement ... is not essential to the application of the rule
... to prevent.., a breach of the fiduciary duties owing to the minority. ' 2 6 9
The court emphasized that by virtue of their majority ownership, majority
shareholders have the power to direct the corporation in everything it does, plac-
ing them in the shoes of the corporation and making the majority shareholders
"the actual, if not the technical, trustees" for the minority shareholders.2 70
More recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Hajmm Company
v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc.,27 1 addressed constructive fraud arising from a
fiduciary breach by a corporation and its directors in refusing to redeem a re-
volving fund certificate. The defendant corporation bought one hundred percent
of the stock of Raeford Turkey Farms, Inc., of which plaintiff owned twenty-five
percent.272 In exchange for plaintiff's stock, defendant corporation issued to
plaintiff a revolving fund certificate. 27 3 When plaintiff later requested that de-
fendant corporation redeem the certificate, defendants refused.274 Plaintiff
claimed this refusal constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.275 Although the cor-
poration carried the instrument on its books as equity,276 defendant corporation
maintained that the instrument was debt.277 Thus, the defendant corporation
269. 234 N.C. 340, 344, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1951) (quoting 13 AM. JuR. CORPORATIONS,
§§ 422-23, at 474-76 (1938)). In Gaines the majority attempted to squeeze out the minority by pass-
ing resolutions to decrease dividends and issuing additional common stock at a time when plaintiff
was unable to purchase his pro-rata shares. This conduct amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty
even though no actual fraud was shown. Id. at 344-45, 67 S.E.2d at 353; see supra note 248.
270. Gaines, 234 N.C. at 344, 67 S.E.2d at 353. Quoting from 13 AM. JUR. CORPORATIONS,
§§ 422-23, at 474-76 (1938), the court further explained:
The devolution of unlimited power imposes on [majority shareholders]... the duty of
a fiduciary or agent.., to protect the interests of the minority in the management of the
corporation, especially where they undertake to run the corporation without giving the
minority a voice therein .... It is the fact of control of the common property held and
exercised ... that creates the fiduciary obligation [of the majority to the minority] ....
Actual fraud or mismanagement, therefore, is not essential to the application of the rule.
It is well established that courts of equity will entertain jurisdiction, at the instance of
minority stockholders of a private corporation who are unable to obtain redress within the
corporation and have no adequate remedy at law, to restrain threatened ultra vires acts on
the part of the majority or to prevent any other act on the part of the majority which may
be denominated as a breach of trust or a breach of the fiduciary duties owing to the
minority.
Gaines, 234 N.C. at 344-45, 67 S.E.2d at 353 (quoting AM. JUR. CORPORATxONS, §§ 422-23, at 474-
76 (1938)).
271. 94 N.C. App. 1, 379 S.E.2d 868, disc rev. allowed as to unfair trade practice issue, 325 N.C.
271, 382 S.E.2d 439 (1989).
272. Id. at 5, 379 S.E.2d at 870.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 5, 379 S.E.2d at 871. The defendants claimed the corporation's bylaws gave them
sole discretion whether to redeem the plaintiff's certificate. Id.
275. Id. at 4, 379 S.E.2d at 870. Plaintiff also asserted that defendants' refusal to retire the
revolving fund certificate violated the corporate bylaws and constituted an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. Id.
276. Id. at 5, 379 S.E.2d at 871.
277. Id. at 11, 379 S.E.2d at 874.
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claimed no fiduciary duty existed in a debtor-creditor relationship.278
The court found the existence of a fiduciary duty on two grounds. First, in
language reminiscent of traditional fiduciary duties, the court found that a fidu-
ciary duty" 'exists in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed
in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with
due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.' "279 The second im-
portant basis for finding a fiduciary duty was that the issuance of the revolving
fund certificate had some characteristics of a corporation/shareholder relation-
ship.280 The court cited the then applicable North Carolina statute, which pro-
vided that "[o]fficers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and to its shareholders .... ,,281
The court further stated that once plaintiff established that defendant owed
him a fiduciary duty and that duty was breached, this "amounted to construc-
tive fraud."'28 2 Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion were in
agreement on this point.283 It is apparent that North Carolina clearly recog-
nizes that fiduciary breaches by corporate officers and directors constitute con-
structive fraud.
Although North Carolina courts have not addressed the issue of whether
eliminating a minority shareholder by a cash-out merger constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty and thus constructive fraud, other jurisdictions have.284 The Del-
aware Supreme Court in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corporation argua-
bly adopted a constructive fraud theory. The court reasoned that "specific acts
of unfair dealing which constitut[e] breaches of fiduciary duties," regardless of
the presence or absence of actual "deception," may entitle the minority share-
holder to equitable relief.285 The supreme court overruled the lower court's
opinion that "absent deception," a minority shareholder is limited to an ap-
praisal under Weinberger.28 6 However, in Delaware only certain kinds of fiduci-
ary breaches trigger equitable remedies outside of the appraisal remedy.
278. Id. The official comments to the new Act make it clear that no fiduciary duty governs the
debtor-creditor relationship. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 official comments (1990).
279. Hajmm, 94 N.C. App. 11, 379 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting Abbit v. Gregory, 210 N.C. 577, 598,
160 S.E. 896, 906 (1931)).
280. Id. at 11, 379 S.E.2d at 874.
281. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (1990)).
282. Hajmm, 94 N.C. App. at 12, 379 S.E.2d at 874.
283. Id. at 20, 379 S.E.2d at 879 (Greene, J., dissenting).
284. Under the earliest statutes authorizing cash as appropriate merger consideration, courts
consistently treated take-outs as constituting constructive fraud. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 639.
Drafters of earlier statutes probably did not intend to authorize fraud, either actual or constructive,
in connection with the merger provision. Id.
285. 498 A.2d 1099, 1100, 1103 (Del. 1985). See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
Weinberger itself supports the ruling in Rabkin. In Weinberger, the court said the appraisal remedy
is generally exclusive absent "fraud, [and] misrepresentation." Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701,
714 (Del. 1983). By including "fraud" and "misrepresentation" in its list of exceptions, Weinberger
must have intended the term "fraud" to encompass constructive fraud; otherwise, the court's lists of
exclusivity exceptions is redundant. Also, the Cole decision, from which Weinberger derived its
equitable exceptions to the appraisal remedy, contemplated a cause of action for constructive fraud
resulting from the undervaluation of shares. Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 58,
156 A. 183, 188 (1931).
286. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1100, 1108.
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Because the Delaware courts no longer apply the independent business purpose
test under Weinberger, a cash-out merger consummated by a controlling share-
holder without a valid business purpose is not a fiduciary breach per se. The
supreme court in Rabkin recognized that its opinion will "necessarily... require
the [lower courts] to closely focus" on distinguishing and sustaining complaints
that aver fiduciary breaches "that are reasonably related to and have a substan-
tial impact upon the price offered" from those "questioning judgmental factors
of valuation. ' 28 7 The court nonetheless believed that limiting a minority share-
holder to an appraisal, "provided there was no deception, regardless of the de-
gree of procedural unfairness employed to take their shares," was unfair.288 The
lower courts must distinguish a fiduciary breach case from a price inadequacy
case, the court concluded, or otherwise "Weinberger's concern for entire fairness
loses all force."'289
Finally, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green290 supports an interpretation that a breach of fiduciary duty consti-
tutes constructive fraud. In that case the Court held that a breach of fiduciary
duty for unfair dealing by a corporation, absent deception, is not a rule lOb-5
violation, given the "deceptive or manipulative" language in section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.291 Implicitly, a breach of fiduciary duty con-
stitutes fraud absent the "manipulative or deceptive" requirement in rule lOb-
5.292 Although a breach of fiduciary duty fails to trigger equitable relief under
rule lOb-5 in federal courts, it may still trigger equitable relief under state corpo-
rate laws if the elements of fraud are not expressly limited to deception. North
Carolina's appraisal exclusivity provision limiting minority shareholders solely
to an appraisal "unless the corporate action is fraudulent" is open to such an
interpretation.
. Breach of Fiduciary Duty is "Unlawful"
The issue of whether a breach of fiduciary duty is "unlawful" must over-
287. Id. at 1107-08; see supra note 134. Mere inadequacy of price does not equal fraud unless
the undervaluation suggests bad faith or reckless indifference to the rights of the minority sharehold-
ers. Cole, 18 Del. Ch. at 58, 156 A. at 188.
288. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1108.
289. Id.
290. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
291. Id. at 474-77.
292. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). The Second Circuit held that although rule lOb-5 plainly reaches both material misrepresen-
tations and nondisclosures, neither is an essential element to proving a rule lOb-5 violation. There-
fore, rule lOb-6 must reach, as the court opined, "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against
minority shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure." Id. at 1287.
Significantly, the court of appeals reasoned that "[w]hile the 'fraud' at which 10b-5 is aimed obvi-
ously includes the classic examples of misrepresentation and nondisclosure.. . '[graud, indeed, in
the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealnents which involve a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed ....'" Id. at 1289-90 (quoting
Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889)) (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that rule lOb-5 requires actual misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure even in the presence of a breach of fiduciary duty. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 470-
71.
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come any presumption that by deleting the former provision conferring a fiduci-
ary duty on corporate officers and directors, 293 the new Act somehow dilutes
corporate fiduciary duties. The North Carolina Commentary to the new Act
emphasizes that the deletion "is not intended to modify in any way the duty of
directors recognized under the former law."'294 Furthermore, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court recognized corporate fiduciary duties owed by majority
shareholders to the minority shareholders in Gaines v. Long Manufacturing,
InC2 95 in 1951, long before the corporate statute codifying fiduciary duties of
directors and officers took effect.296 Thus, based on the comments to the new
Act and prior case law, corporate fiduciary duties remain in force. Breaches of
these duties may represent "unlawful[ness]" under the new Act.
The legislative history of the new Act also supports the argument that fidu-
ciary breaches are "unlawful." As originally introduced in the North Carolina
General Assembly, 297 the appraisal exclusivity provision contained language
limiting unlawfulness to procedural violations under the new Act, the corporate
charter, or shareholders' agreements.298 While under consideration in the
House, however, pressure mounted until ultimately the House rejected and de-
leted this language. 299 Hence, this deletion arguably indicates the General As-
sembly's intent not to limit unlawfulness to mere procedural violations.
Authority in other jurisdictions further supports the theory that a breach of
fiduciary duty in the cash-out merger context is "unlawful." New York case law
sets the leading precedent. In Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corporation, the New
York Supreme Court noted many fiduciary obligations imposed on a controlling
shareholder.30° The major duties, according to the court, include treating all
shareholders, majority and minority, fairly and equally, discharging corporate
responsibilities in good faith, and managing the company prudently. The court
summarized: "When a breach of fiduciary duty occurs, that action will be con-
sidered unlawful and the aggrieved shareholder may be entitled to equitable
relief."
3 0 1
C. Business Purpose Test
In trying to answer the question of whether a cash-out merger constitutes a
293. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) (referenced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 N.C. Commen-
tary and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (1990)).
294. Id. § 55-8-30 N.C. Commentary (1990). The new Act sets forth the director's standard of
care for executing his corporate duties, but does not state affirmatively that he has a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders. The provision merely codifies the business judgment rule,
making no reference to fiduciary duties. The official comments to the North Carolina Business Cor-
poration Act explain that the "[r]emoval of the word 'fiduciary' was solely because of confusion in
other jurisdictions between the corporate and the trust standards of fiduciary duty." Id.
295. 234 N.C. 340, 344-45, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (1951).
296. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1452 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-8-30 (1990)).
297. See supra note 88.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
299. See supra text accompanying note 92.
300. 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568-69, 473 N.E.2d 19, 25-26, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 673-74 (1984).
301. Id. at 569, 473 N.E.2d at 26, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (emphasis added).
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breach of fiduciary duty that is either "unlawful or fraudulent," neither the lan-
guage of nor the official comments to the Revised Model Act is helpful. 30 2 The
official comments to the Revised Model Act include procedural violations con-
travening corporation laws on voting or articles of incorporation, "deception of
shareholders," and "violation of a fiduciary duty" as examples of instances when
courts are free to intervene with equitable relief notwithstanding appraisal
rights.30 3 Intentionally making "no attempt to specify particular illustrations,"
the Revised Model Act drafters decided not to answer the central question of
what misconduct constitutes unlawfulness or fraud so that courts are free to
intervene with equitable relief. 304
Nor did the Revised Model Act drafters elaborate on particular standards
for evaluating if and when certain cash-out mergers constitute fiduciary
breaches. They instead "designed [the Revised Model Act language] to recog-
nize and preserve the principles" from leading states like Delaware and New
York.30 5 Courts in these two states developed certain judicial tests-namely the
"entire fairness" test and the "business purpose" test-for evaluating cash-out
mergers. The New York courts use both tests for evaluating whether a cash-out
merger is an "unlawful or fraudulent" breach of fiduciary duty under the New
York appraisal exclusivity statute. In Delaware, where the corporate statutes
contain no appraisal exclusivity provision, courts use only the "entire fairness"
test to evaluate whether a cash-out merger involves "fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable over-
reaching," 30 6 so that a dissenting shareholder is entitled to enjoin the merger or
receive other equitable relief.
The Revised Model Act is silent on the business purpose test. By embrac-
ing the principles of Delaware and New York law that present conflicting views
on the business purpose test, the Revised Model Act fuels the confusion sur-
rounding the issue of whether a controlling shareholder can cash out a minority
shareholder in a merger without a business purpose. First, the official comments
expressly cite Weinberger as support for the proposition that an appraisal rem-
edy may be inadequate "where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate
waste of corporate assets, or gross or palpable overreaching are involved. '30 7
Arguably, however, Weinbergers deletion of the business purpose test implicitly
becomes a part of the Revised Model Act standard for evaluating when these
exclusivity exceptions arise. Simultaneously, the official comments note that
"section 13.02(b) basically adopts the New York formula as to [appraisal] exclu-
sivity" by using New York's "unlawful" and "fraudulent" terms expressly.308
One could argue that, by this adoption, the Revised Model Act implicitly should
302. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
303. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 13.02(b) official comment 2 (1984).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
307. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr § 13.02(b) official comment 2 (1984) (quoting Wein-
berger, 457 A.2d at 714).
308. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 13,02(b) official comment 2 (1984); see supra note 96.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
follow the standard later set forth by the New York courts in Alpert, which
applies the business purpose test in evaluating the validity of cash-out mergers.
Thus, the Revised Model Act itself incorporates the law from two leading states
that have adopted entirely opposing standards for determining when a cash-out
merger is invalid as a breach of fiduciary duty under the business purpose test.
In this manner, the Revised Model Act sets up the business purpose test
dichotomy.
Delaware courts, at the time of the adoption of the Revised Model Act, had
abandoned the business purpose test as an independent threshold test and an-
nounced the rule that a cash-out merger was permitted only if the merger trans-
action could meet the entire fairness test. Although the Weinberger court stated
that in non-fraudulant transactions fair price outweighes fair dealing such that
there is no equitable relief, Rabkin recognized that non-fraudulant transactions
may involve breaches of fiduciary duty that require equitable relief.3° 9 Arguably
Weinberger, read with Rabkin, implicitly recasts the business purpose test from
an independent threshold test as espoused in Singer into a single factor of fiduci-
ary duty the court should consider under the fair dealing aspect of the entire
fairness test.
In 1984, the same year in which the Revised Model Act was completed, the
New York court announced its rule in Alpert that a cash-out merger was gov-
erned by the business purpose test as well as by Weinberger's entire fairness test.
By doing so, New York announced a standard for its "fraudulent or unlawful"
language. Unlike the Delaware standard, proving "entire fairness" under the
New York standard is not enough.3 10 The New York courts enforce the fiduci-
ary duty a majority shareholder owes the minority shareholders through the use
of the business purpose test, which operates as an independent threshold3 11 in
addition to the entire fairness test. Under New York case law, the manner of
negotiations surrounding the price may be entirely fair, but if the corporation
cannot justify its actions based on some corporate purpose other than minority
elimination, the merger may be enjoined. 312
Thus, precedent exists under the Revised Model Act to interpret a standard
of review governing the validity of cash-out mergers as either, following New
York law, adopting the business purpose test, or following Delaware law, abol-
ishing it. Because the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the Revised
Model Act's broad, vague language verbatim, North Carolina courts must de-
309. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemi-
cal Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1107-08 (Del. 1985).
310. Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 472 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667
(1984).
311. Id. at 573, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77.
312. The Alpert court summarized its position as follows:
[I]n entertaining an equitable action to review a freeze-out merger, a [New York] court
should view the transaction as a whole to determine whether it was tainted with fraud,
illegality, or self-dealing, whether the minority shareholders were dealt with fairly, and
whether there exists any independent corporate purpose for the merger.
Id. at 573, 473 N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
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cide the business purpose issue.3 13 Not only must the North Carolina judiciary
address whether its standard of review will encompass the business purpose test,
but if it does, it also must decide what business purpose will suffice to satisfy the
test.
In analyzing whether North Carolina should embrace the business purpose
test, three factors are critical: the appraisal exclusivity provision's legislative
history, Meiselman's "reasonable expectations" impact, and the similarity of
North Carolina's appraisal exclusivity statute to parallel New York and Massa-
chusetts statutes. First, legislative history surrounding the exclusivity provision
is significant. The Drafting Committee, along with the concurrence of the Gen-
eral Statutes Commission and the Corporate Law Study Commission, expressly
excluded the business purpose test from the original language of the exclusivity
provision when it was introduced into the legislature.3 14 The legislature rejected
and deleted this language in the final passage of the bill as a compromise to
making the remedy expressly non-exclusive.315 Notably, in the final rounds of
debate, the Drafting Committee, in response to even stronger concern expressed
by practicing lawyers, had recommended that the bill's proposed language, as
drafted by it and introduced into the Senate, be amended.3 16 Specifically, the
suggested changes included deleting the procedural compliance qualification
pertaining to "unlawful," the extension of "fraudulent" to include "grossly ineq-
uitable," and the "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" standard regarding
proof of fraud or gross inequity.3 17 Hoping to quell the political rumbling over
the appraisal exclusivity issue by recommending these deletions, the Drafting
Committee at the very least sought to salvage the explicit application of the
provision to cash-out mergers and the express rejection of the business purpose
test.318 Instead, when it ratified into law its final version, the general assembly
deleted all the recommended changes as proposed by the Drafting Committee
plus it deleted the bill's express rejection of the business purpose test.3 19 Thus,
when confronted with language that it could have simply adopted, as urged by
the Drafting Committee, the general assembly chose to eliminate this language,
arguably a strong indication of its intention to retain the business purpose test.
Furthermore, under Meiselman, North Carolina protects minority share-
holders' "reasonable expectations" when controlling shareholders squeeze mi-
nority shareholders out of a close corporation. Although the Meiselman rule
313. See Farris, Shareholder's Rights and Liabilities, published by the North Carolina Bar Con-
tinuing Legal Education for the November 16-17, 1989 seminar "The New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act," vol. 1 (1989). Farris writes that North Carolina will not need to address the
business purpose test. Id. This Comment argues that this statement is a misinterpretation of the
new provision.
314. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
315. See supra text at note 92.
316. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 3 (April 8, 1989).
317. Russell Robinson, Chairman of the Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee, ex-
pressed concern that the "burden to establish that a cash-out merger is inequitable to minority share-
holders may be too great." General Statutes Commission Minutes at 7 (April 7, 1989).
318. Id.
319. See supra note 92.
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arose under the judicial dissolution provision, 320 it applies by analogy to the
appraisal proceeding because the action of the controlling shareholder in both
situations denies the minority shareholder the benefit of his reasonable expecta-
tions. Under the Meiselman decision, the controlling shareholder is not allowed
to deny the minority shareholder the benefit of his investment, and as such, his
reasonable expectations. 321 In the cash-out merger situation, the controlling
shareholder should not be allowed to deny the minority shareholder the benefit
of his continued equity investment in the company without a business purpose.
Under the new Act, the minority shareholder's reasonable expectation to con-
tinue his equity interest in the close corporation he helped build should be
protected.
Like the Massachusetts and New York statutes, the new North Carolina
Act has the "unlawful or fraudulent" language in its exclusivity provision. The
Delaware code does not. In deciding the breadth of these two terms, the Massa-
chusetts court in Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club322 and the New
York court in Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corporation323 both discuss Dela-
ware's Weinberger decision at length, expressly adopting the entire fairness test
espoused in Weinberger but rejecting its abandonment of the business purpose
test as an independent threshold test.324
Furthermore, in discussing the meaning of the "unlawful or fraudulent"
language, both the courts in Massachusetts and New York interpreted a breach
of fiduciary duty as itself illegal, and, as such, an exception to the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy.325 The Delaware court did not need to face this issue
320. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125, 125.1 (1982) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-
30, 55-14-31 (1990)).
321. While the plaintiff contended his "rights and interests" included secure employment, fringe
benefits, and management participation, the court did not decide the issue but remanded the case for
further findings of fact. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 302-06, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564.67
(1983).
322. 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986).
323. 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984).
324. Coggins, 397 Mass. at 531, 492 N.E.2d at 1116-17; Alpert, 63 N.Y.2d at 570-71, 473 N.E.2d
at 26-27, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
325. Coggins, 397 Mass. at 532, 492 N.E.2d at 1117 (Given that the Massachusetts statute lists
"illegal or fraudulent" conduct as exceptional cases where appraisal is not exclusive, the court held
that it "is justified in exercising its equitable power when a violation of fiduciary duty is claimed.");
see also Alpert, 63 N.Y.2d at 569, 473 N.E.2d at 26, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (Under New York's
exclusivity statute which lists "unlawful or fraudulent" misconduct as exceptions to when the ap-
praisal remedy should be exclusive, the court found that "[w]hen a breach of fiduciary duty occurs,
that action will be considered unlawful.").
In finding that a fiduciary breach had occurred, the New York court in Alpert based its decision
on the grounds that all shareholders of the same class are entitled to equal treatment. Id. at 572, 473
N.E.2d at 28, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 676. Because one was cashed out and one was left with the operating
assets of the business, this different treatment resulted in a breach of fiduciary duty that could be
justified only by the controlling shareholder demonstrating some valid corporate purpose. Id. The
Massachusetts court in Coggins went even further. Coggins can be distinguished from Alpert in that
a breach of fiduciary duty was found even though the shareholders were not members of the same
class. The minority shareholders were nonvoting common shareholders, while the controlling share-
holder owned 100% of the voting common stock. Coggins, 397 Mass. at 527, 492 N.E.2d at 1114.
The court concentrated on the fact that the controlling shareholder, as the 100% controlling share-
holder of both corporations in the merger, "violate[d] his fiduciary duty when he use[d] the corpora-
tion for his... personal benefit in a manner detrimental to the corporation." Id. at 534, 492 N.E.2d
at 1118. Thus, a breach of fiduciary duty can exist even where equal treatment among the share-
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squarely. 326
Beyond noting these similarities between North Carolina's exclusivity pro-
vision and those of New York and Massachusetts, the North Carolina judiciary
should note North Carolina's kindredship with New York on the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine. In Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,327 the New York
court followed North Carolina precedent by protecting the minority share-
holder's "reasonable expectations" in the judicial dissolution context as set forth
in Meiselman. Construing statutory language that provided for a judicial disso-
lution when "directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of
illegal, fraudulent or oppressive action," the New York court stated that the
minority shareholders' reasonable expectations should be protected.328 Thus
Meiselman finds acceptance in other jurisdictions in the judicial dissolution con-
text.329 However, whether New York or North Carolina will apply the reason-
able expectation doctrine to the standard of review for cash-out mergers is
uncertain. In drafting the official comments to the new Act, the General Stat-
utes Commission recommended incorporating a reference to "reasonable expec-
tations, ' 330 but the Drafting Committee opted to omit this reference and the
General Statutes Commission later agreed. 3 31 The Drafting Committee felt that
it was "improper to tell the courts in a comment what they could or could not
take into account ... [particularly since] 'reasonable expectations' have never
before been considered in connection with a cash-out merger. ' 332 Thus, like the
exclusivity issue itself, whether the business purpose test and "reasonable expec-
tations" doctrine should apply to cash-out mergers is left to judicial
interpretation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the legislative history of the exclusivity provision, North Carolina's
Meiselman precedent for protecting the "reasonable expectations" of minority
shareholders, the similarities of North Carolina's exclusivity statute with those
of New York and Massachusetts, and North Carolina's heritage of being pro-
shareholder in light of Delaware's pro-management stance,333 North Carolina
holders is not the central issue. Under Coggins, unequal treatment among different shareholder
classes is not tolerated where one class uses the corporation to its benefit over other classes.
326. Delaware has no appraisal exclusivity provision. Abolished as an independent test, the
business purpose arguably operates as a mere factor under fair dealing test. See supra note 309.
327. 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
328. Id. at 70 n.l, 71-72, 473 N.E.2d at 1177 n.1, 1178-79, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 803 n.l, 804-05; see
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 10, § 9.30, at 142.
329. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 10, § 9.30, at 141-43 ("One of the most
significant trends in the law of close corporations" is the courts' increasing willingness to look at
shareholders' reasonable expectations.).
330. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 8 (February 5, 1988). The Statutes Commission
recommended that the official comments include a statement directing the courts to use Meiselman
in determining whether an action by the controlling shareholder was "grossly inequitable" such that
equitable relief was available. Id.
331. General Statutes Commission Minutes at 5 (December 2, 1988).
332. Id.
333. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes at 3 (December 20, 1985).
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should adopt a standard of review that encompasses both the business purpose
and entire fairness tests for evaluating cash-out mergers in the close corporation
context.3 34 Particularly given the significant differences between close and pub-
lic corporations, 33 5 North Carolina courts should adopt these two tests for cash-
out mergers in which close corporation minority shareholders are eliminated.
This dual standard will give heightened protection to close corporation minority
shareholders who face illiquidity and valuation difficulties, unlike public corpo-
ration minority shareholders. Most importantly, this standard will protect the
unique "reasonable expectations" of close corporation minority shareholders. 336
Regarding the proposed dual standard that would encompass both the en-
334. Because the issues are very different regarding public corporation minority shareholders'
investments, expectations, and degree of protection needed and warranted, this Comment is limited
to considerations pertaining to the appropriate standard for non-public corporations. For a discus-
sion focusing upon the review standard for public corporation freeze-out mergers, see Note,
Freezeouts Under The 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act: The Need for Protection of Minority
Shareholders from "Going Private" Mergers, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 679 (arguing that Illinois courts
should expand the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by controlling shareholders and apply
a balancing test, on a case-by-case basis, that requires the controlling shareholders to demonstrate
that legitimate corporate benefits from the merger outweigh the minority's interest in continued
corporate participation). The standard governing the cash-out merger of public corporation minor-
ity shareholders may be the same high standard as suggested by this Comment for close corporation
minority shareholders. With public corporations, securities laws on both the state and federal levels
regulate full disclosure of information to protect the public investor. Given the significant differ-
ences between close and public corporation minority shareholders, a more flexible standard regard-
ing the business purpose test may be warranted for mergers where public corporation minority
shareholders are cashed-out. Whether the standard advocated herein should apply as well to public
corporations is not addressed.
Notably, the new Act differentiates between the close and public corporation on numerous oc-
casions. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1-40(18a), (g), 55-13-30(d) (1990).
One proposal before the House was to apply the exclusive remedy to only public corporations
and to retain the former standard for non-public corporations, giving dissenting shareholders any
right available "in law or equity." See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Members of the Draft-
ing Committee thought this standard for non-public corporations was too uncertain, leaving the non-
public corporations without any standard at all. This Comment does not advocate such a drastic
measure. This Comment encourages the North Carolina judiciary to adopt the dual "entire fair-
ness" and "business purpose" standard. In the application of this dual standard to non-public cor-
porations, this Comment urges the judiciary to consider the special vulnerability of the close
corporation minority shareholder and put teeth into the standard by interpreting "unlawful" or
"fraudulent" to encompass a breach of fiduciary duty at a minimum for non-public corporations, if
not for all corporations.
The North Carolina Commentary to the new Act states that the exclusivity provision covers
cash-out mergers and that "in determining whether a merger was 'unlawful' or 'fraudulent,' the same
standard applies regardless of whether the consideration received--cash, other property or shares of
a surviving corporation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02 N.C. Commentary (1990). Clearly, the lan-
guage in the comments contemplates a uniform standard based on the type of consideration involved,
But arguably the courts are free to construe and apply a standard that distinguishes between the type
of corporation involved, a public versus non-public corporation, as seen earlier in Meiselman in its
construction and application of the judicial dissolution provision. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 288-93,
307 S.E.2d at 557-59. Such a distinction is advisable in this instance, given the special vulnerability
of the close corporation minority shareholder. See Note, supra note 198, at 950, 954. Despite the
Indiana legislature's recent enactment of a slightly altered version of the Revised Model Act's exclu-
sivity provision, making the appraisal remedy absolutely exclusive, the Note distinguishes a "passive
investor" in a public corporation from an "owner/employee" in a close corporation. Id. The com-
mentator argues that Indiana courts should "issue an injunction in situations where the shareholder
of a closely held corporation risks losing both investment in financial and human capital, particularly
when the risk arises from a breach of managerial duty." Id.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 231-59.
336. Id; see supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text..
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tire fairness and business purpose tests, some commentators argue that the busi-
ness purpose test is ineffective.337 These comments focus predominantly on the
Delaware court's decimation of the rule in Tanzer v. International General In-
dustries, Inc. by its broad interpretation that the controlling shareholder can
vote to satisfy his desires as a shareholder and ignore his director responsibili-
ties. In contrast, the Massachusetts court put teeth into its business purpose test
under its Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club decision when it re-
quired a business purpose unrelated to the selfish personal interest of the con-
trolling shareholder. North Carolina courts should follow the lead of the
judiciary in New York and Massachusetts by adopting the business purpose test
that some business reason, although not compelling, should support the control-
ling shareholders choice to cash out the minority.
This rule would make it clear that a controlling shareholder of a close cor-
poration could not cash out a minority shareholder when doing so would benefit
only the controlling shareholder. However, should the fact that business is suf-
fering because of intense conflict between the shareholders constitute a valid
business purpose? Allowing this purpose to suffice might again permit the evis-
ceration of the business purpose test.338
North Carolina courts should adopt this dual standard, which includes
both the entire fairness and business purpose tests, such that a merger not meet-
ing these tests would be an unlawful or fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty. This
standard recognizes the minority shareholder's "reasonable expectation" to con-
tinue his close corporation equity interest.339 The greatest advantage of this
dual standard is that it forces the parties to enter arm's-length negotiations di-
rectly upfront to determine when one shareholder can buy out the other at any
time for any reason whatsoever. As seen in the close corporation context under
Coleman v. Taub,340 the controlling shareholder would benefit from negotiations
resulting in a valid shareholders' agreement in that he could avoid the fiduciary
obligations imposed by the dual standard of the entire fairness and business pur-
pose tests. A valid shareholders' agreement 34 1 allows the parties to discuss and
agree on circumstances that will trigger a buyout of any sort and devise a pricing
formula in the event that such occurs. The close corporation minority share-
holder would also benefit from negotiations in drawing up a shareholders' agree-
ment; he would be able to protect himself before entering the business by gaining
full knowledge of the controlling shareholder's intentions concerning buyouts
and by setting forth his reasonable expectations surrounding his continued in-
337. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
338. Id.
339. See Note, supra note 198, at 950 (arguing that despite an exclusive remedy which makes it
possible to more equitably value shares, the difficulty in valuing the lost expectations of an owner/
employee still remains, such that the legal remedy under the statute is inadequate).
340. 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (decision handed down during the period when Delaware rec-
ognized both the "entire fairness" and the "business purpose" tests).
341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (1990); see also Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763
(1978) (the court stopped short of formulating a precise definition of a shareholders' agreement,
although it upheld a bylaw that empowered the corporate directors to designate an executive com-
mittee to oversee the corporation's employment needs).
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vestment.342 At the very least, such a rule would encourage communication
between the parties so that the minority shareholder will fully appreciate the
conflict and squeeze-out risks associated with his minority interest.
The parameters regarding when one shareholder could buy out another
shareholder at any time "for any reason whatsoever" 343 should be negotiated at
arm's length with full disclosure to all the parties of the contract's consequences.
If the contract terms are unsuitable, any potential shareholder could refrain
from investing in the business. The controlling shareholder typically has the
power to initiate negotiating efforts prior to incorporation. If he knows he can-
not otherwise eliminate a minority shareholder without a valid business purpose
in a fair manner at a fair price under the dual standard suggested for adoption
by North Carolina, the controlling shareholder will have more of an incentive to
negotiate upfront. If North Carolina does not adopt the dual standard for merg-
ers where close corporation minority shareholders are cashed out, controlling
shareholders can easily cash out minority shareholders and are thereby en-
couraged to surprise the minority shareholders by their later forced elimination.
In sum, the entire fairness and business purpose tests would benefit all
North Carolina close corporation shareholders by encouraging both parties to
contract before they invest. Where good faith negotiations are not undertaken,
true economic progress is not impeded by the dual standard because mergers are
allowed where true valid business purposes support them and the minority
shareholders receive a fair price. As such, this standard would encourage eco-
nomic progress. Mergers would be justified where a valid business purpose sup-
ports the transaction and where the minority shareholder is paid a fair price and
dealt with in a fair manner. In essence, this dual standard represents a balancing
by the courts, as a last resort, of the competing interests held by majority and
minority shareholders should the parties fail to balance their competing interests
on their own through communication and negotiations.
JULIE GWYN HUDSON
342. See Brudney and Chirelstein, supra note 10, at 1357 n.9; see also Business Corporation Act
Drafting Committee Minutes at 13 (October 28, 1987) (committee member noted the "the world
would be better off in the long run if potential investors are told clearly and in no uncertain terms
that, if they buy into a minority situation, they had better treat their investment as a redeemable
bond or obtain an agreement to the contrary" (emphasis added)).
343. See Taub, 638 F.2d at 636.
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